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NOTES 
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Left To One’s Devices:  Congress Limits 
Patents on Medical Procedures 
Brett G. Alten* 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly three centuries ago in England, generations of doctors 
from the Chamberlen family saved women from death and injury 
with the predecessor of obstetric forceps.1  To keep their forceps 
secret from other physicians, the Chamberlen doctors blindfolded 
the women during labor, sealed the delivery room from prying 
eyes, and rang bells and blew whistles during the procedure.2  The 
Chamberlen doctors gained competitive advantage and profited 
from their remarkable invention because they kept it secret.3 
Some believe, however, that the Chamberlen doctors would 
have patented their invention and the accompanying medical pro-
cedure had they been given the opportunity to do so.4  Then, they 
could have publicized the forceps and the medical procedures 
 
* Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1998.  The author is thankful for guid-
ance from Professor Joseph Garon of Fordham University School of Law, as well as 
Elaine Drager, Douglas Cardwell, Jennifer Weissman, Gene Lee, and Russell Faegen-
berg.  This Note is dedicated to my wife Tomoko for giving me time and support. 
1. See, e.g., M. Thiery, De uitvinders van de verlostang en de obstetrische hefboom 
[The inventors of the obstetric forceps and the obstetric lever], 54(1) VERH K ACAD 
GENEESKD BELG 45-53 (1992); R.M. Matthews, Historical note (obstetrical forceps and 
Dr. Peter Chamberlen), 35(270) J.R. C. GEN. PRAC. 44 (1985); M. Dumont, Histoire et 
petite histoire du forceps. [History and sidelights on the forceps], 13(7) J. GYNECOL. 
OBSTET. BIOL. REPROD. 743 (1984); Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, Congressional Legislation Would 
Restrict Medical Patents, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8, 1996, at S1. 
2. See Lewis, supra note 1, at S1 (noting that this may possibly be the origin of the 
term “bells and whistles”). 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
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while still receiving financial gains.5  Such disclosure of the proce-
dures could have permitted further development and improve-
ment.6 
Until recently, patents on medical procedures were rarely 
granted and even more rarely enforced in the United States.7  But 
by 1996 it was estimated that as many as fifteen medical proce-
dures were patented every week.8  As a result, leaders of the medi-
cal profession scrambled to stamp out that trend, based on the be-
lief that medical procedure patents threaten innovation.9 
On September 30, 1996, Congress included a limitation on 
medical procedure patent infringement in the Omnibus Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act of 1997.10  The provision, section 
287(c),11 created a safe haven from patent infringement liability 
under certain circumstances.  Proponents of section 287(c) argue 
that it addresses problems with medical procedure patents and the 
infringement lawsuits that naturally flow from the ownership and 
enforcement of those patents.12 
 
5. See id. 
6. See, e.g., Thiery, supra note 1 (noting Rogier Roonhuyse’s “more effective” in-
strument for dealing with the problem of an impacted head). 
7. See Brian McCormick, Just Reward or Just Plain Wrong? Specter of Royalties 
From Method Patents Stirs Debate, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 5, 1994, at 3. 
8. See Wendy W. Yang, Patent Policy and Medical Procedure Patents:  The Case 
for Statutory Exclusion From Patentability, 1 B.U. J. SCI, & TECH. L. 5 (1995); Carolyn 
Lederman, M.D., Pallin patent is invalidated; Ophthalmic surgeon Samuel Pallin aban-
dons patent for sutureless cataract procedure, OPHTHALMOLOGY TIMES, June 1, 1996, at 
34 (noting a paper prepared by the American Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery, 
which estimated that medical procedure patents are issued by the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office at the rate of 750 per year); Rep. Greg Ganske, Medical Procedure 
Patents Put Patients at Risk, Legal Restrictions on Life-Saving Techniques Increase 
Health Care Costs and Threaten Consumers, ROLL CALL, Sept. 16, 1996 (reporting that 
as many as one hundred pure medical patents are issued each month). 
9. See Sabra Chartrand, Why is This Surgeon Suing?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at 
Dl. 
10. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Limitation On Patent Infringements 
Relating To A Medical Practitioner’s Performance Of A Medical Activity, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, § 616 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (Supp. 
1996)). 
11. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
12. See President Signs Medical Patent Bill; Physicians Freed from Threat of New 
Medical Procedure Patent Lawsuits, P.R. Newswire, Oct. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, 
NEWS Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Medical Patent Bill]. 
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The recent enforcement of a medical procedure patent against a 
physician alerted the public to the possible ramifications of such a 
patent13 and probably was the driving force behind the passage of 
section 287(c). The medical procedure patent at issue was granted 
to Dr. Samuel L. Pallin for a surgical procedure:  stitchless cataract 
surgery.14  Dr. Pallin’s patented procedure reduces the probability 
of astigmatism, lowers the chance of infection, and shortens recov-
ery time.15  In exchange for disclosing the procedure in his patent 
to the medical profession, Dr. Pallin planned to charge ophthal-
mologists a royalty to use it.16 
In 1994, Dr. Pallin initiated what may be the first United States 
patent infringement suit involving a medical procedure patent and 
physician defendant.17  Opponents of medical procedure patents 
argued that because as many as half of all cataract procedures per-
formed in the United States might employ Dr. Pallin’s procedure, 
his patent represented a significant cost increase to patients and the 
health care system in general.18  Dr. Pallin maintained, however, 
that the technique actually saves patients money, even with an es-
timated five-dollar royalty, because the procedure eliminates the 
need for a seventeen-dollar suture, resulting in a twelve-dollar sav-
ing.19  In addition to saving patients money, Dr. Pallin contended 
that the procedure would not even be known or available to the 
medical profession had he not patented and disclosed it.20  In 
 
13. See Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (D. Vt. 1995) (denying the motion for 
summary judgment by the alleged infringers of a patented surgical technique); see also 
Charles Craig, Biotech Backers Fear Medical Patent Ban Will Hurt Industry, 
BIOWORLD TODAY, July 26, 1996. 
14. Cataract Surgical Procedure, United States Patent No. 5,080,111 (issued Jan. 14, 
1992) [hereinafter Cataract Surgical Patent]. 
15. See id. 
16. See McCormick, supra note 7, at 4. 
17. See Pallin, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1050. 
18. See Chet Scerra, Medical Patent Bill Gives Doctors New Protections, 
OPHTHALMOLOGY TIMES, Jan. 15, 1997, at 28. 
19. See Should Surgical Procedures be Patentable?, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1995, at 
Z12 (reporting that the total cost of such a surgery is usually about $1,000, making the 
$5.00 fee equivalent to a 0.5% royalty). 
20. See Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act:  Hearings on H.R. 
1127 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 134 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1127] (testimony of 
Dr. Samuel Lear Pallin). 
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March 1996, however, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Vermont terminated Dr. Pallin’s suit by issuing a consent 
order that invalidated the claims at issue and enjoined Dr. Pallin 
from enforcing his patent.21 
But the controversy surrounding the patentability of medical 
procedures did not end with the issuance of the Pallin consent or-
der.22  On the contrary, legislation pending in the United States 
Congress23 was amended24 and section 287 (c) became law.25 
Section 287(c) precludes a plaintiff from filing a civil action 
for either monetary damages or injunctive relief against a medical 
practitioner or against a related health care entity for performing a 
“medical activity” that would otherwise constitute an infringement 
or inducement to infringe under United States patent law.26  There-
fore, when a medical procedure is found to be a “medical activity,” 
that procedure, although patentable, is not enforceable.27 
Section 287(c) did not become law quietly; vigorous debate 
surrounded its predecessor bil1s.28  At the heart of the controversy 
was the question of whether a long tradition of sharing medical 
knowledge and techniques should give way to contemporary no-
tions of intellectual property rights.29  Some contended that doctors 
had an ethical obligation to disseminate innovations without 
charge.30  Others believed that doctors had the same rights as engi-
 
21. See Pallin v. Singer, No. 2:93-CV-202, 1996 WL 274407, at *1 (D. Vt. Mar. 28, 
1996) (issuing a consent order declaring all of Dr. Pallin’s patent claims in the case inva-
lid). 
22. See Eye Surgeon Loses Effort To Enforce His Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, 
at D20; John D. Murnane & Lisa B. Kole, Congress Debates M.D. Monopoly on Tech-
nique, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at C19; Chartrand, supra note 9, at Dl. 
23. See S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995). 
24. See S. 2105, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996). 
25. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), available in WESTLAW, 1996 
H.R. 3610, at *149-52. 
26. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-863 (1995). 
27. The scope and meaning of the term “medical activity” is very difficult to deter-
mine.  See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
28. See supra notes 23 and 24 (citing the predecessor bills). 
29. See Steve Wilson, Patents take Medicine Another Step in Wrong Direction, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 9, 1995, at A2. 
30. See Edward Felsenthal, Medical patents Trigger Debate Among Doctors, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 11, 1994, at B1. 
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neers or chemists, who traditionally obtain patents and royalties for 
new techniques.31 
This Note argues that Congress erred by passing section 287(c) 
because it prevents inventors of medical procedures from obtaining 
patent protection.  Part I briefly discusses and reviews medical 
procedure patent law in the United States.  Part II examines the 
legislative history of section 287(c) and explores various policy is-
sues surrounding the patenting of medical procedures.  Part III 
highlights problems associated with section 287(c), applies the leg-
islation to two medical procedure patents, and demonstrates the 
ways in which the law is vague, substantively deficient, and an in-
vitation to litigation. This Note concludes that section 287(c) 
should be repealed or at least significantly modified to avoid injus-
tice. 
I. MEDICAL PROCEDURE PATENT LAW 
A patent forms a social contract between an inventor and soci-
ety.32  The inventor provides a disclosure to society “that teaches 
one of ordinary skill in the art how best to make and use” a novel, 
useful, and non-obvious invention.33  In exchange, society denies 
others, for a limited time, the right to make, use, sell, or import the 
invention.34  This part discusses that mutual exchange, including 
the requirements for obtaining a patent in the United States and the 
rights of patent owners—especially medical patent owners. 
A. Statutory Requirements to Obtain a United States Patent 
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to make 
laws which “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
 
31. See Wilson, supra note 29, at A2. 
32. Skewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489 (1974) (stating that a pat-
ent is a public bargain, granting exclusive use in return for disclosure).  See generally 
Brian P. O’Shaughnessy, The False Inventive Genus:  Developing a New Approach for 
Analyzing the Sufficiency of Patent Disclosure Within the Unpredictable Arts, 7 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 147, 149 (1996) (“The patent grant is a social 
contract.”). 
33. Id. 
34. See id. 
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Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”35  This clause 
probably derives from fourteenth century English patent law36 and 
reflects the Constitution’s underlying instrumentalist policy.37  For 
example, Justice Story asserted in a very early case, that the main 
object of the constitutional grant is to promote science and the use-
ful arts; reward to individual inventors is merely a means to an 
end.38 
Although the Constitution empowers Congress to establish a 
patent system, the Constitution does not itself establish one.39  
Therefore, the Constitution does not provide inventors with any 
patent rights directly, and it sets no standards for the patentability 
of individual inventions.40 
The first United States patent statute was passed in 1790 
(“1790 Act”),41 during the early days of the first Congress.42  
Originally, the 1790 Act granted patents under a procedure involv-
ing three high-level government officials, an arduous system, 
which Congress replaced in 1793 with pro forma registration.43  In 
1836, a formal system using professional examiners replaced the 
pro forma registration system.44  Since that time, the patent system 
has developed substantially,45 undergoing its first major revision in 
 
35. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cls. 8, 18.  According to the United States Constitution: 
[8] [The Congress shall have Power] To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Art, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; 
. . . . 
[18] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof. 
Id. 
36. See Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical 
Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139, 1144, n.28 (1987). 
37. See id. at 1144. 
38. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.), 19 (1829). 
39. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 36 (1992). 
40. See id. 
41. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (1790). 
42. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 7. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. at 7-8 (noting that the “more than novel” requirement was added in the 
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1952, which clearly defined the requirements an inventor must 
meet in order to obtain a patent.46  Three of those requirements are 
set forth in section 101 of title 35 of the United States Code (“sec-
tion 101”).47 
Section 101 states that a patent may be granted to “who[m]ever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof . . . .”48  In other words, section 101 requires that an 
invention must be novel, useful, and fall within one of four statu-
tory classes of subject matter—processes, machines, manufactures, 
and compositions of matter.49  The usefulness and statutory subject 
matter requirements are explicit in section 101, but the novelty re-
quirement, alluded to by the word “new” in section 101, is treated 
more fully under section 102 of title 35 of the United States Code 
(“section 102”).50  In addition, section 103 of that title (“section 
103”) further addresses novelty by precluding the grant of patents 
where the differences disclosed are obvious in light of the prior art. 
Finally, to earn the grant of a patent, an inventor must provide, 
among other things, a disclosure of the invention that is sufficient 
to warrant the rights the inventor will receive.  The specific re-
quirements are set forth in section 112 (“section 112”). 
1. Novelty 
A requisite to obtain a patent for an invention is that a person 
must disclose and teach something new.51  An invention is not new 
when all the elements of the invention are present in a single piece 
of relevant “prior art.”52  Section 102 sets out in detail what is 
 
mid-nineteenth century to limit the number of patents issued at that time). 
46. See id. at 9. 
47. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).  According to section 101:  “Who[m]ever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”  Id. 
48. Id. 
49. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 9. 
50. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1975). 
51. See, e.g., HERBERT SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW & PRACTICE 49-73 (2d ed. 1995) 
(providing a summary of the prerequisites to patentability). 
52. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 
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available as prior art.53 
In order to show a claimed invention lacks novelty, a single 
prior art device or practice must anticipate the claimed invention—
each and every element of the claimed invention must be disclosed 
in the single device or practice.54  That is, there must be no differ-
ence between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, 
as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the inven-
tion.55  Thus, a party challenging novelty must demonstrate, among 
other things, identity of invention.56  Essentially, section 102 en-
sures that only new products and processes are patentable.57 
Under section 102(b), an invention may not be publicly used 
more than one year prior to the date of the application for a patent; 
otherwise, the invention will be barred.58  That means that an in-
vention may be publicly used and discussed up to one year before 
an application for a patent is filed in the Patent Office, without los-
ing any United States patent rights.59  Moreover, under the “ex-
perimental use” doctrine, an inventor may refine the invention or 
assess its value relative to the time and expense of prosecuting a 
patent application, even if that experimental use is more than one 
year before the filing date of the patent application.60  Thus, it is 
well established that experimental use is not public use.61 
 
1985), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 976 (1985). 
53. Thorough analysis of every subsection of section 102, however, is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
54. See ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 3.2, at 57 (3d ed. 
1994). 
55. See id. at 58. 
56. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 
976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
57. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 51. 
58. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1975). 
59. Public disclosure of the invention, however, before the filing date of an applica-
tion for patent would likely be sufficient to defeat patentability in most countries. 
60. In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
61. See Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg., Co., 815 F.2d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 
Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Melody L. Har-
ness, What is “Experimental” Medical Treatment?:  A Legislative Definition is Needed, 
44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67 (1996).  But see HARMON, supra note 54, at 82-86 (stating that a 
potential problem with the “experimental use” approach occurs with respect to “showing 
an experimental purpose”). 
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2. Utility 
In order to obtain a patent, a person must teach something use-
ful.62  Interestingly, although utility is a relatively rare issue of 
contention during the prosecution and enforcement of patents,63 
courts have used issues of functional utility to deny medical pat-
ents.  Today, the utility requirement is met provided that the inven-
tion works in a way to solve the problem it was designed to solve64 
and the invention provides some minimum social benefit or util-
ity.65  The social benefit or utility aspect is most relevant to medi-
cal procedure patents. 
The issue of whether a particular invention had social utility 
was at issue in several early court decisions.  For example, in one 
case, Justice Story noted that a socially useful invention is one that 
is beneficial and not injurious to the morals, health, or good order 
of society.66  In another case, Justice Story explained that utility 
would be lacking if an invention were “frivolous or injurious to the 
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”67  In other 
words, the invention “must achieve a human purpose that is not il-
legal, immoral or contrary to public policy.”68 
Historically, the courts have disallowed patents on inventions 
on such public policy grounds in a number of cases.69  For exam-
ple, during the nineteenth century, the doctrine of social utility was 
often invoked to deny patents on gambling devices and products or 
processes useful only for perpetrating fraud.70  That is, a patent 
was withheld only if the invention could not have been used for 
 
62. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 51. 
63. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 147. 
64. See id. 
65. See, e.g., id. (cautioning that the invention may not be completely harmful or 
deleterious). 
66. See Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (“By useful invention, in 
the statute, is meant such a one as may be applied to seem beneficial use in society, in 
contradistinction to an invention, which is injurious to the morals, the health, or the good 
order of society.”). 
67. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (No. 8568) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
68. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS:  A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, 
VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 4.01 (1996). 
69. See id. § 4.03. 
70. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 156. 
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any honest and moral purpose.  But, as some commentators have 
argued, the courts should not apply subjective ideas of honesty and 
morality because those ideas change with time.71  Therefore, when 
properly viewed, the public policy doctrine should be a narrow 
one.72  Nonetheless, throughout this early period, courts invoked 
the doctrine of social utility to deny certain types of patents.73 
In 1941, the courts began turning away from the doctrine of so-
cial utility to deny patents, especially when based on indeterminate 
moral standards.74  In 1966, the Supreme Court, under the direction 
of Chief Justice Warren, lowered the utility threshold further and 
required the government to refuse the grant of a patent unless an 
inventor proved any existing, practical use.75  Later, the Supreme 
Court refined this rule and held that an invention must have a spe-
cific social benefit, i.e., “practical utility,” in a currently available 
form to justify patentability.76  More recently, the Eighth Circuit 
 
71. See id. at 157.  Another commentator has noted that: 
Courts have in some instances talked of “morals, health, and good order of so-
ciety” in determining utility.  Anyone whose life has spanned a decade or two 
in the 20th Century has witnessed how moral standards can change in a period 
of a few years.  Gambling devices, frowned upon early in the century, are legal-
ized in several states; race tracks and lotteries are now used to generate sub-
stantial amounts of income in many states.  Birth control devices, in a period of 
thirty to forty years, have come from a position of illegality to a position where 
they are welcomed by some as a means of curbing a population explosion.  
Thus, in determining “utility” based on public morals, the courts should apply a 
test which will not penalize an inventor who may be prescient enough to be an-
ticipating basic needs of a society changed by forces yet unrecognized by the 
general public. 
R. CHOATE, PATENT LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 380 (1973), quoted in CHISUM, supra 
note 68, § 4.03. 
72. See CHISUM, supra note 68, § 4.03. 
73. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 39, at 156 (recounting the denial of patents on 
inventions related to gambling); see also, e.g., Schultz v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal. 
1897) (denying a patent on coin return device for coin-operated machines because the 
invention had potential applications to slot machines); National Automatic Device Corp. 
v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (N.D. Ill. 1889) (denying a patent on a toy horse race course be-
cause the course was used in bars for betting purposes). 
74. See Chicago Patent v. Genco, 124 F.2d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 1941) (distinguishing 
pinball from gambling to uphold a patent on a pinball machine); see also MERGES, supra 
note 39, at 156. 
75. See JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW:  LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 
3.02[3], at 3-6 (1996). 
76. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529-36 (1966) (holding that 
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Court of Appeals lowered the utility threshold even further by 
holding that even a slight degree of utility is sufficient; in short, 
“the defense of non-utility cannot be sustained without proof of to-
tal incapacity.”77 
3. Patentable Process Subject Matter 
In addition to being useful, the subject matter of the invention 
must fall within a statutory class of subject matter.78  In order to be 
patentable, the invention must be either a process, machine,79 
manufacture,80 or composition of matter.81  Under section 100(b), 
the term “process” means process, art or method, and includes a 
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition 
of matter, or material.82 
 
“[u]nless and until a process is refined and developed to this point—where specific bene-
fit exists in currently available form, there is insufficient justification for permitting and 
applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field”); see also, e.g., SCHLICHER, su-
pra note 75, at 4 (summarizing three factors set forth in Brenner for determining practical 
utility:  (1) the concern about cartels, (2) the quid pro quo ideas about the dissemination 
of invention, and (3) the quid pro quo ideas about use after expiration). 
77. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Berkeley, 620 F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17 (8th Cir. 
1980). 
78. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 49. 
79. See, e.g., Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Halliburton, 306 U.S. 550 (1939) (equating the 
term “machine” with the term “apparatus”); Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 
366 (1909) (detailing that historically the Supreme Court required a machine to be “a 
thing visible to the eye” and “an object of perpetual observation”); Corning v. Burden, 56 
U.S. 252 (1854) (explaining that the term “machine” includes “every mechanical device 
or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce 
a certain effect or result”). 
80. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (finding that the term 
“manufacture” means “articles prepared for use from raw materials by giving to these 
materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combination, whether by hand labor or by 
machinery”); Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699 (3d Cir.) (holding that the term 
“manufacture” is “anything manmade that is not a machine or a composition of matter”), 
cert. denied, 229 U.S. 617 (1913). 
81. See, e.g., Diamond, 447 U.S. 303 (explaining that the term “composition of mat-
ter” means all compositions of two or more substances and all composite articles, 
whether the result of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether gases, fluids, 
powders, or solids). 
82. See id. 
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4. Non-obviousness 
In addition to the requirements set forth in sections 101 and 
102, an invention under section 103 (“section 103”) must be non-
obvious to be patentable.83  That is, if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are obvious, no patent will be 
granted for that invention.84  Again, the focus is to earn a patent for 
teaching and disclosing to the public something significant. 
The Supreme Court applied section 103 in four steps:  (1) de-
termining the scope and content of the prior art, (2) ascertaining 
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, (3) 
resolving the level of skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, and 
(4) determining the obviousness of the subject matter against the 
background of the first three steps.85 
When determining the scope and content of the prior art, it is 
generally accepted that printed publications, prior use or knowl-
edge, United States patent applications, and another’s invention in 
the United States, are relevant.86  Therefore, in contrast to novelty, 
 
83. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952).  Section 103 provides, in pertinent part: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Id. 
84. See id. 
85. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).  According to the 
Graham court: 
Under 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differ-
ences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the 
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.  Against this background, 
the obviousness or non-obviousness of the subject matter is determined.  Such 
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, 
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances sur-
rounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. 
Id. 
86. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 60.  Schwartz detailed the content of prior art 
as including (1) printed publications or patents from anywhere in the world that were 
published or issued before the applicant’s date of invention, (2) prior use or prior knowl-
edge that occurred in the United States before the applicant’s date of invention, (3) a 
United States patent application that subsequently issued and was filed before the appli-
cant’s date of invention, and (4) another’s invention that was made in the United States 
and was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed before the invention date of the inven-
tion in question.  Id. 
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a patent may be denied to an inventor if the invention is obvious in 
view of one or more pieces of prior art, even though any single ref-
erence does not describe the invention identically.87 
Moreover, whether an invention is patentable over the prior art 
depends upon whether the subject matter of the claim, taken “as a 
whole,” would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art 
at the time the claimed invention was made.88 
5. Disclosure, Enablement, and Best Mode 
Not only must an inventor teach—the inventor must teach cor-
rectly.  When a patent is granted to an inventor, society’s right to 
make, use, or sell an invention is deferred for a limited time in ex-
change for a disclosure that teaches the public how best to make 
and use that invention.89  The disclosure of the invention in the pat-
ent is the quid pro quo for the grant of rights.90  The theory is 
based on the assumption that the amount of goods and services will 
increase because some secrets will be disclosed immediately and 
used freely after the patent expires.91 
The standard for disclosure set forth in section 112 requires 
that the specification, i.e., the descriptive portion of the patent, 
must contain a written description that enables any person skilled 
in the art to make and use the invention, and set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor.92  Section 112 also mandates 
that the inventor must claim the invention with definiteness.93  A 
 
87. See id. 
88. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (stating that a court must evaluate a “claim as a whole” and not unduly focus on 
one facet of the claimed invention), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984); In re Yettito, 274 
F.2d 953 (1960). 
89. See O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 149. 
90. See SCHLICHER, supra note 75, § 2.18[3]. 
91. See id. 
92. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1975).  According to section 112: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and ex-
act terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with 
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth 
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
Id. 
93. Id.  Section 112 states that “[t]he specification shall be concluded with one or 
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claim is a brief, one-sentence definition of the invention for which 
rights are granted.94  In summary, an adequate disclosure must con-
tain an enabling written description, the best mode contemplated 
by the inventor, and at least one definite claim.95 
An enabling written description is considered the most impor-
tant element of adequate disclosure.96  The inventor must describe 
the invention clearly enough so one skilled in the field of the in-
vention can make and use it without a great deal of experimenta-
tion.97  The inventor also must describe clearly what is actually 
claimed in the patent.98 
The “best mode” requirement forces the inventor to tell the 
public the best embodiment that the inventor knows for practicing 
the claimed invention.99  The applicant must disclose the invention 
fully, including the relevant “tricks of the trade,” such as specific 
techniques, instrumentalities, or characteristics for best putting the 
invention into practice.100  Since 1965, courts have used this re-
quirement to compel inventors to describe the most commercially 
valuable embodiment of the invention, the most efficient way of 
making it, and the most valuable way of using it known to the in-
ventor at the time the application was filed.101 
Finally, the requirement of claim definiteness ensures the pub-
lic can discern the boundaries of the inventor’s legal right.102  
Where the claims fail to apprise a skilled reader of the scope of the 
invention, or whether they are broader than the invention justifies, 
the Patent and Trademark Office is required to refuse to grant a 
patent and the courts are required to hold it invalid if the Patent 
 
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards has his invention.”  Id. 
94. See SCHLICHER, supra note 75, § 7.02. 
95. The requirement for an “enabled written description” is really two separate re-
quirements, including “enablement” and “written description.”  For the purpose of this 
Note, however, they have been combined and treated as a single requirement. 
96. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 516. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. See id. at 517. 
100. See O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 160. 
101. See SCHLICHER, supra note 75, § 7.02. 
102. See MERGES, supra note 39, at 516. 
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and Trademark Office inadvertently grants it.103 
The preamble is an introductory phrase of a claim that may 
summarize the invention, its relation to prior art, or its intended use 
or properties.104  According to one court, however, the preamble 
may be more than mere introductory language, concluding that the 
preamble is as significant as the claim filer desires.105  In fact, the 
preamble itself has been found to act as a claim limitation to define 
what is covered by the patent in precisely the same way as words 
in the claim’s body.106 
B. Medical Patent Infringement and Relief 
Generally, a patentee enjoys the rights to stop infringers and 
exact damages from them.  Occasionally, the courts impose com-
pulsory licenses when the act of stopping the infringers is inequita-
ble or may cause the public harm.  Courts are willing to deny in-
junctive relief when there is a substantial risk of harm to the public 
interest, but seem less likely to deny injunctive relief when the pat-
ent is not a medical necessity or lifesaving device.107  This section 
discusses infringement, the patent right to injunctive relief, and the 
duty to provide compulsory licenses to infringers where the public 
interest so mandates. 
1. General Background 
The Patent Act defines the rights granted to a patentee.108  The 
 
103. See SCHLICHER, supra note 75, § 7.02[1][a]. 
104. See CHISUM, supra note 68, § 806[1](b). 
105. See Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 
55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).  According to the Bell Communica-
tions court: 
[The] preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it.  In 
other words, when the claim drafter chooses to use both the preamble and the 
body to define the subject matter of the claimed invention, the invention so de-
fined, and not some other, is the one the patent protects. 
Id. 
106. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
107. See CHISUM, supra note 68, § 20.04. 
108. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1980).  According to section 154(a)(1): 
Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the in-
vention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United 
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intellectual property rights of patent holders are often compared to 
the real property rights of real estate owners.109  If a patent is 
analogized to real property, its claims correspond to the metes and 
bounds recited in a deed, and an infringer of those claims corre-
sponds to a trespasser.110  The infringement of claims and the tres-
passing on real estate are both civil wrongs, but patent infringe-
ment is a statutory wrong, governed by federal law and defined 
under section 271.111 
Patent infringement analysis involves two steps.  First, the con-
struction of the meaning and scope of the asserted claim and sec-
ond, the comparison of the accused device to the properly con-
strued claim.112  Even though the construction of the meaning and 
scope is purely a matter of law,113 the court may consider the lan-
guage of the claim, the specification of the patent, and the prosecu-
tion history of the application for the patent in the Patent and 
Trademark Office.114  Expert testimony and other extrinsic evi-
dence may be used as an aid to understand the patent.115  Technical 
treatises and dictionaries are preferred sources of extrinsic evi-
dence.116 
There are two types of infringement—literal infringement and 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.  Literal infringe-
ment occurs when each and every limitation of the patent claim ex-
ists, precisely as claimed, in the accused activity or device.117  In-
 
States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from us-
ing, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, . . . referring to the 
specification for the particulars thereof. 
Id. 
109. See O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 151. 
110. See D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW BASICS § 16.02, at 16-4 (1996). 
111. Id.  Section 271(a) provides that “whoever without authority makes, uses, of-
fers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the 
patent, infringes the patent.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
112. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
113. See id. 
114. See id. at 979. 
115. See id. at 980-81. 
116. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
C.C.P.I. Inc. v. American Premier, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 813, 818 n.10 (D. Del. 1997). 
117. See Johnston v. I.V.A.C. Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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fringement under the doctrine of equivalents “prevents a copyist 
from evading patent claims with insubstantial changes.”118  Al-
though application of this doctrine by the courts is rarely simple, it 
is well-settled that there can be infringement under the doctrine 
only if there is objective proof that any differences between the 
claimed invention and accused device are merely “insubstan-
tial.”119 
Summary judgment may be appropriate in a patent case where 
infringement is the issue to be decided, because “construction of a 
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within 
the province of the court.”120  The standard for summary judgment 
in a patent case is the same as in any other type of action.121  
Summary judgment is appropriate only where the materials sub-
mitted for and against the motion show that “there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law.”122  The standard is high123 to avoid 
depriving a party of its right to trial.124  Summary judgment is not 
proper if evidence supporting a factual dispute is shown requiring a 
trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differences at trial.125 
Although patents are presumed valid, their validity may be 
challenged in proceedings such as motions for summary judg-
ment.126  Invalidity must be shown by clear and convincing evi-
dence as to all material facts.127  To meet this high burden on sum-
mary judgment, a challenger must show that no fact material to the 
issue of invalidity is in dispute, and that even if all material factual 
inferences are drawn in favor of the patentee, the challenger is still 
 
118. Valmont Indus. v. Reinke Mfg., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
119. Hilton Davis Chem., Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517-18 
(Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
120. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
121. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
123. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
124. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
125. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, 927 F.2d 1565, 1571 
(Fed. Cir. 1991). 
126. See 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
127. See Key Pharm., Inc., v. Hercon Labs, 981 F. Supp. 299, 310 (D. Del. 1997). 
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still entitled to judgment as a matter of law.128  Thus, the burden of 
showing invalidity by summary judgment is higher than that of in-
fringement, but involves much of the same analysis.129 
If patent infringement is shown, equitable relief is normally 
available to the patent owner under the law.130  For example, since 
1819,131 courts have granted patent owners injunctive relief to pre-
vent infringement of a patent.132  Over the years, two exceptions 
developed to this principle, thereby denying injunctive relief in 
certain circumstances.  The first applies where an injunction would 
cause substantial injury to the public interest.133  In that case, 
courts require a patent owner to grant a compulsory license to the 
infringer.134  The second applies where the detriment to the in-
fringer severely outweighs the benefit to the patent owner.135  The 
courts however, rarely use this exception.136  For the purposes of 
this Note, the first exception is the most relevant. 
 
128. See Continental Can Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1265 
(Fed. Cir. 1991). 
129. See, e.g., SmithKline Diagnostics v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that “claims must be interpreted and given the same meaning 
for purposes of both validity and infringement analyses”). 
130. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283-285. 
131. See Act of February 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481-82 (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 283); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 97 n.503 (explaining that the Patent 
Act of 1819 granted the federal courts “[u]pon any bill in equity [the] . . . authority to 
grant injunctions, according to the course and principles of courts of equity . . . on such 
terms and conditions as the said courts may deem fit and reasonable”). 
132. See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  The King 
Instruments court noted that: 
The market may well dictate that the best use of a patent is to exclude infring-
ing products, rather than market the invention . . . .  Under this situation, the 
Patent Act is working well.  The patentee is deriving proper economic return on 
its investment in acquiring a patent right.  The public benefits from the disclo-
sure of the invention and the ability to exploit it when the patent term expires. 
Id. at 950.  This strong public policy is often enforced by providing injunctive relief.  Id. 
at 960 (Nies, J., dissenting); see also B.F. Goodrich Flight Sys. Inc. v. Insight Instruments 
Corp., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832, 1844 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (opining that “all of society benefits 
from the protection of patent rights, since it is the seed of inventive genius the Constitu-
tion and the statutes construing it seek ultimately to protect”). 
133. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 98 n.505; Bliss v. Brooklyn, 3 F. Cas. 706 
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 1,544). 
134. See Bliss, 3 F. Cas. 706. 
135. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 98 nn.506, 507. 
136. See id. 
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When the public interest is at issue, courts use an equitable bal-
ancing approach in deciding whether to award injunctive relief or 
to require a compulsory license.  For example, a court denied in-
junctive relief to an owner of a patent covering medical test kits 
because of an overriding public interest.137  In fact, a number of 
courts held that injunctive relief will not be awarded to a patent 
owner when contrary to the notions of equity.138  One court went 
so far as to conclude that, under section 1498 of title 28 of the 
United States Code, the government may even be able to “take” an 
invention if warranted by public interest concerns and provide 
“adequate compensation” to the patent holder.139 
Nonetheless, even when courts find that an injunction is con-
trary to the public interest, they have proposed creative solutions 
that attempt to minimize public harm while respecting owners’ 
patent rights.  One court granted a permanent injunction but pro-
vided a one-year grace period to the owner of a patent involving 
rapid-exchange catheters.140  The grace period was apparently in-
 
137. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-30 (1908) 
(finding that a patent owner may enforce its rights under a patent irrespective of that 
owner’s use of the invention); Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (C.D. 
Cal. 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
138. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1500, 
1517 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (denying an injunction to the owner of a patent covering surgical 
cutters because to “suddenly withdraw these [cutting] devices from the market could have 
a serious disruptive effect on surgical practice”); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. 
Alumni Research Found., 64 U.S.P.Q. 285 (9th Cir. 1945) (finding that public interest 
was sufficient to deny an injunction on the process of irradiation of margarine); Ca. Med. 
Prod. Inc. v. Emergency Med. Prod. Inc., 796 F. Supp. 640, 648 (D.R.I. 1992) (denying 
injunctive relief because “[wlhile there is a public interest in product availability, it is 
unlikely that the public would suffer from a shortage of extrication collars if the injunc-
tion were granted”). 
139. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  It was 
pointed out by Justice Nies, however, that this conclusion may only be possible if one 
elevates rewards to patentees over other public interests.  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1498.  
According to section 1498: 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United 
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the 
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s rem-
edy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Claims 
Court for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use 
and manufacture. 
28 U.S.C. § 1498. 
140. See Schneider (Europe) A.G. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 813 (D. 
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tended to minimize the impact to the medical community that 
would otherwise occur if the infringing devices were removed 
from the marketplace at once.141  By providing notice to the medi-
cal community that the infringer’s devices would not be available 
after one year, that community apparently could anticipate and 
prepare for the removal of the infringing devices.142  In Schneider, 
the court concluded that even though a physician prefers an in-
fringer’s device, which alone does not justify the denial of an in-
junction.143  It is noteworthy, however, that the court considered 
important that alternative devices were available to physicians and 
found that the infringer’s device was not significantly or objec-
tively superior to other catheters in performance.144 
In another patent case involving a catheter, the court agreed 
that, although it was in the public interest to minimize the disrup-
tion in hospitals in terms of their selection of safety catheters by 
denying injunctive relief, the disruption would best be minimized 
by granting the preliminary injunction.145  The court held that if the 
preliminary injunction was denied, the defendant might have per-
suaded additional hospitals to buy and use its safety catheter.146  
Then, if the patentee succeeded in obtaining a permanent injunc-
tion at the trial, those additional hospitals would also be dis-
rupted.147 
Other courts have enforced injunctions against the manufacture 
 
Minn. 1994).  The Schneider court maintained that: 
The permanent injunction . . . shall contain a one-year transition period to allow 
an efficient and non-disruptive changeover for those institutions and physicians 
who now employ the [infringer’s product] exclusively.  Defendant shall pay 
Plaintiffs a 15% royalty rate on Defendant’s sales . . . during that time.  After 
the transition period ends, the permanent injunction . . . shall take effect. 
Id. at 861-62 (internal citations omitted). 
141. See id. 
142. See id. 
143. Id. (holding that the “physician preference of the infringer’s device does not 
justify the denial of an injunction”). 
144. Id. (noting that injunctive relief was granted because “all the non-infringing 
catheters were not defective, unsafe, or incapable of performing as intended and required 
during the medical procedure”). 
145. See Critikon Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1362, 1371 (D. Del. 1993). 
146. Id. at 1373. 
147. See id. 
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of patented medical devices.  One court granted a permanent in-
junction against an infringer’s sale of a cardiac defibrillation de-
vice.148  Another court granted injunctive relief to the patent holder 
because the accused infringing device was not a “medical neces-
sity.”149  Congress and the courts, however, have not substantially 
elaborated on what is meant by the terms “medical necessity” and 
“lifesaving devices.”150 
2. With Respect to Medical Procedures 
Ever since the constitutional grant of power of 1787, United 
States patent law has attempted to define what constitutes pat-
entable subject matter with respect to medical procedure patents.151 
In Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary,152 the court upheld the 
unpatentability of a surgeon’s use of ether on patients to minimize 
suffering during surgery.153  The court concluded that even though 
a discovery is brilliant and useful, it may not be patentable unless it 
is “set to work,” and is in connection or combination with the 
means by which, or the medium through which, it operates.”154  
 
148. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1439, 1445 (E.D. Pa. 
1988), rev’d & remanded, 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied, 879 F.2d 849 (Fed. Cir. 
1989).  According to the Eli Lilly court: 
While the public interest is unquestionably advanced through the marketing of 
potentially lifesaving devices [by denying injunctive relief] . . . , Congress has 
determined it better for the nation in the long run to afford the inventors of 
novel, useful and non-obvious products short-term exclusivity on such products 
rather than to permit free competition in the goods. 
Id. 
149. Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Paragon Optical Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1033 (D. 
Ariz. 1987). 
150. Eli Lilly, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1441. 
151. See CHISUM, supra note 68, § 1.03[3], at 1-70. 
152. 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1862). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 884.  According to the Morton court: 
A discovery may be brilliant and useful, and not patentable.  No matter through 
what long, solitary vigils, or by what importunate efforts, the secret may have 
been wrung from the bosom of Nature, or to what useful purpose it may be ap-
plied.  Something more is necessary.  The new force or principle brought to 
light must be embodied and set to work, and can be patented only in connection 
or combination with the means by which, or the medium through which, it op-
erates. 
Id. 
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Unfortunately, the rationale of Morton is less than clear, especially 
when read as an application of the traditional rule that new analo-
gous uses of old products are not patentable because the new use of 
ether “seemed strikingly new and non-analogous.”155 
Some twenty years after Morton, in Brinkerhoff v. Aloe,156 the 
Supreme Court upheld the invalidity on a method of treating piles 
and stated that “the methods or modes of treatment of physicians 
of certain diseases are not patentable.”157  For authority, the Court 
relied on Morton, but clearly stated the rational for the per se rule 
excluding medical methods—namely, the uncertainty that any 
medical method will achieve the desired result.158 
About fifty years later, a court recognized the significance of 
medical procedure patents and signaled a retreat from the rule set 
forth in Brinkerhoff.159  Although relying in part on Morton, Dick 
v. Lederle Antitoxin Laboratory,160 held that a method for perform-
ing a skin test was the proper subject of a patent because the test 
was an “operable method.”161  Following Dick, a number of deci-
sions retreated from the position that medical methods are unpat-
entable.162  In Ex parte Scherer,163 the per se rule of Brinkerhoff, in 
which medical methods were found to be unpatentable, was over-
ruled by the Board of Appeals for the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice.164  In Scherer, the Board of Appeals upheld the validity of a 
patent on a method of injecting medicine by a pressure jet.165  The 
Board of Appeals held that the utility, not the certainty of the re-
sults, should determine whether a medical procedure is pat-
entable.166  One commentator, however, notes that Scherer is a 
Patent and Trademark Office decision that serves as precedent only 
 
155. CHISUM, supra note 68, § 1.03[3], at 1-71. 
156. 146 U.S. 515 (1892). 
157. Id. at 519. 
158. Id. 
159. See Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin Lab., 43 F.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). 
160. 43 F.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). 
161. Id. at 630. 
162. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 187 n.49 (1987). 
163. 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 107 (1954). 
164. See CHISUM, supra note 25, at 1-73. 
165. Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. at 107. 
166. See CHISUM, supra note 25, at 1-73. 
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within that office and is limited to its context; it cannot be consid-
ered persuasive authority for the patentability of medical and sur-
gical procedures generally.167 
In Martin v. Wyeth,168 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the invalida-
tion of two method claims on the basis of obviousness.  The claims 
merely applied an old device to a new use, but the new use was 
analogous to former uses of the device.169  The court did remark, 
however, that patents for medical or surgical methods have been 
found valid,170 and it was assumed that “a medical or surgical 
method may, if otherwise patentable, be placed in the category of 
an art and therefore within reach of the statute.”171 
Thus, until section 287(c) became law, neither Congress, the 
courts, nor the United States Patent and Trademark Office intro-
duced any special provisions for medical procedure patents, even 
though Congress revised the patent statute four times since the Pat-
ent Act of 1790.172  There were no special hurdles to overcome in 
order to obtain a medical procedure patent.  The “utility” standard 
set forth in Scherer, and the “operability” standard set forth in 
Dick, remained the tests for determining the patentability of medi-
cal procedures inside and outside the Patent and Trademark Office, 
respectively. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 287(C) 
Although the enforcement of Pallin’s patent against a physician 
in 1994 brought the controversy concerning medical procedure 
patents to an apex, the controversy is not new.173  For example, in 
the 1870s, the controversy became so heated that a dentist, who 
was sued for patent infringement by the Goodyear Company on a 
method of making rubber dentures, murdered a Goodyear Offi-
 
167. See id. 
168. 96 F. Supp. 689, aff’d, 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951). 
169. See id. at 695. 
170. See Ruskin v. Coe, 58 F. Supp. 424 (D.D.C. 1945); Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin 
Lab., 43 F.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 507 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
171. Martin, 96 F. Supp. at 695. 
172. See Burch, supra note 36, at 1145. 
173. See Medical Patent Bill, supra note 12. 
ALTEN.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
860 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:837 
cer.174  Also, at about the same time, the press portrayed German 
pharmaceutical companies as “blackmailing humanity” because 
they obtained certain medical procedure patents.175 
In response to these events, a House Committee on Patents in 
1902 submitted to the House of Representatives a Report recom-
mending the passage of House Bill 12451.176  House Bill 12451 
sought to relieve medical and dental practitioners from “unjust 
burdens imposed by patentees holding patents covering methods 
and devices for treating human diseases . . . .”177  Before failing in 
Congress, the bill was approved by thirty-eight state dental asso-
ciations and would have allowed qualified dentists to perform op-
erations “free of royalties for the benefit of society.”178  Many of 
the objections cited by the Committee in support of the 1902 bill 
are similar to the ones cited by modern proponents in support of 
recent legislation,179 including objections on ethical, moral, and 
lack of utility grounds.180  Nonetheless, the early legislation failed 
and the controversy was put to rest for some time. 
In response to the more recent Pallin controversy, Representa-
tive John Bryant of Texas again raised the issue of the patentability 
of medical procedures in the House of Representatives in 1994.181  
By March of 1995, the Medical Procedures Innovation and Af-
fordability Act (“House Bill 1127”) was introduced claiming to 
address the issue of medical procedure patents by limiting their is-
 
174. See Ring, The Rubber Denture Murder Case:  The True Story of the Vulcanite 
Litigations, 32 BULL. HIST. DENT. 3 (1984). 
175. Medical Patent Bill, supra note 12. 
176. H.R. REP. NO. 57-2702 (1902). 
177. Id. at 17. 
178. Id. at 1 (explaining that the bill would have permitted “all legally qualified 
dentists to freely perform various operations upon the mouth and teeth in the interests of 
the public and of special benefit to the public health”). 
179. See H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1334, 
104th Cong. (1995). 
180. See H.R. REP. NO. 57-2702, at 2.  According to House Report 57-2702: 
That patents of this sort are obnoxious and are useless in promoting the indus-
trial arts is evident . . . .  [T]hey interfere with the clear, moral [r]ight—in fact, 
duty—of the physician and surgeon to do for his patents with his own hands 
whatsoever may be required to effect a cure or relieve suffering. 
Id. 
181. See 140 CONG. REC. E1754 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1994) (statement of Rep. Bry-
ant). 
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suance.182  In October of 1995, an alternative act (“Senate Bill 
1334”), which had the same name as the previous House version, 
was introduced and claimed to address the purported problems as-
sociated with medical procedure patents by limiting their enforce-
ment.183 
Those bills were subject to judicial hearings, involving con-
gressional testimony.184  The legislation that eventually became 
law, however, was not subject to judicial hearings and contained 
language not previously considered by the United States Con-
gress.185 
This part provides an accurate legislative history of the new 
section 287(c).  Accordingly, it discusses each of the precursor 
bills considered by Congress that proposed limiting medical proce-
dure patents, relevant congressional testimony, and various public 
commentary.  Finally, it describes the new section 287(c) and a 
House Conference Report interpreting it. 
A. House Bill 1127 
Representatives Greg Ganske and Ron Wyden introduced 
House Bill 1127 to the House of Representatives on March 3, 
1995.186  If passed into law, House Bill 1127 would have prohib-
ited the United States Patent and Trademark Office from issuing 
patents on medical procedures, unless the claimed procedures were 
used in combination with patentable medical products.187 
1. Summary of House Bill 1127 
House Bill 1127 stated that “a patent may not be issued for any 
invention or discovery of a technique, method, or process for per-
forming a surgical or medical procedure, administering a surgical 
 
182. H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995). 
183. S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995). 
184. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20, at 134. 
185. H.R. REP. NO. 57-2702. 
186. H.R. 1127.  House Bill 1127, introduced by Representatives Ganske and Wy-
den, proposed to preclude the issuance of a patent for any invention of a method or proc-
ess for performing a surgical or medical procedure, administering a surgical or medical 
therapy, or making a medical diagnosis.  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-879 (1995). 
187. See id. 
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or medical therapy, or making a medical diagnosis . . . .”  It pro-
vided an exception stating that patents may be issued “if the tech-
nique, method, or process is performed by or as a necessary com-
ponent of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or 
improvement thereof which is itself patentable subject matter, the 
patent on such machine, manufacture, or composition of matter 
may claim such technique, method, or process.” 
2. Comments on House Bill 1127 
House Bill 1127 was introduced to Congress primarily because 
of lobbying efforts by the American Society of Cataract and Re-
fractive Surgery in the form of a coalition called the Medical Pro-
cedure Patents Coalition.188  Other medical organizations sup-
ported House Bill 1127, such as the American Medical Association 
and the American Academy of Ophthalmology, by objecting to 
medical procedure patents primarily on ethical, monetary, and 
moral grounds.189 
On October 19, 1995, the Congressional Subcommittee on 
Courts and Intellectual Property held a hearing on House Bill 
1127.190  Testimony was received from Congressmen, physicians, 
patent attorneys, and other interested parties.191 
 
188. See Silvy A. Miller, Should Patenting of Surgical Procedures and Other Medi-
cal Techniques by Physicians be Banned?, 36 IDEA 255, 255 (1996) (noting that the 
American Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery included over fifteen medical asso-
ciations, including the powerful American Medical Association). 
189. See Miller, supra note 188, at 255; see also Todd R. Miller, The International 
Suture:  A comparative Approach to Patenting Methods of Medical Treatment, 78 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 443, 445 (1996). 
190. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-879 (1995). 
191. See id.  The following individuals testified at the hearing:  the Honorable Greg 
Ganske, U.S. House of Representatives, 4th District, Iowa; the Honorable Ron Wyden, 
U.S. House of Representatives, 3rd District, Oregon; G. Lee Skillington, Counsel, Office 
of Legislative and International Affairs, Patent and Trademark Office United States De-
partment of Commerce; Dr. Samuel L. Pallin, The Lear Eye Clinic, Sun City, Arizona; 
Dr. Jack Singer, Hitchcock Clinic, Randolph, Vermont; Dr. Charles D. Kelman, Presi-
dent, American Society of Cataract & Refractive Surgery; Dr. William D. Noonan, Klar-
quist Sparkman Campbell Leigh & Whinston, Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law 
Litigation and Licensing; Dr. H. Dunbar Hoskins, Jr., Executive Vice President, Ameri-
can Academy of Ophthalmology; and Mr. Donald R. Dunner, Chair, Section of Intellec-
tual Property Law, American Bar Association.  Id. 
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Opponents of House Bill 1127 criticized the legislation as be-
ing over broad and vague.192  Although the bill categorically pro-
hibited the patenting of certain types of medical processes, includ-
ing performance of surgical or medical procedures, administration 
of surgical or medical therapies, and making medical diagnoses,193 
the legislation was criticized as not defining them.194  For example, 
what constitutes a “surgical procedure” is subject to widely differ-
ent interpretations.195  Also, the biotechnology industry, which re-
lies heavily on patents to protect investments in research and de-
velopment, expressed concern regarding the meaning of a “medical 
therapy,” which they believed might reach their industry.196 
The purportedly over broad language contained in House Bill 
1127 may have created more problems than solutions.197  One 
commentator asked what would happen “if a patented process is 
granted under H.R. 1127 and later found to apply to humans?”198  
In that case, the commentator asked whether it would be necessary 
to rescind the patent.199 
Furthermore, House Bill 1127 may have compelled doctors to 
deceive the United States Patent and Trademark Office.200  For ex-
ample, if House Bill 1127 became law, a doctor who might have 
discovered an innovative medical procedure may have chosen to 
hide the inventive aspect of the discovery by obtaining a patent for 
an instrument capable of performing the procedure.201 
 
192. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Baldino) (arguing 
that many exciting new inventions in biotechnology involving new uses for old com-
pounds would no longer be patentable); see also id. (statement of Dr. William Noonan) 
(arguing that although it is desirable to limit patents on medical procedures in accordance 
with foreign patent laws, House Bill 1127 would make United States patent law “much 
more restrictive than even present European patent practices because it would ban U.S. 
patents on new uses of known drugs or products of biotechnology”). 
193. H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995). 
194. See id. 
195. Joel J. Garris, The Case for Patenting Medical Procedures, 22 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 85, 104 n.186 (1996). 
196. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Baldino). 
197. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20. 
198. Id. 
199. See id. 
200. Id. 
201. See id. 
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Testifying before Congress, one physician argued that although 
House Bill 1127 attempted to mitigate the purportedly over broad 
terms by providing an exemption for procedures performed as a 
necessary component of a patentable machine, the exemption was 
rendered “meaningless”202 because an infringer of a patented proc-
ess would already be an infringer of the patented machine, thereby 
providing no additional patent protection and no motivation to dis-
close the procedure.203 
Various legal associations opposed House Bill 1127 because of 
the legislation’s generally flawed approach.  For example, counsel 
for the Office of Legislative and International Affairs, on behalf of 
the Clinton administration, said that “excluding surgical and medi-
cal procedures from patentability” was not the proper way to ad-
dress the issues concerning medical patents.204  Also, the Executive 
Director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, 
Dr. Kirk, opposed the legislation because there was no demon-
strated need for such legislation.205  In fact, Dr. Kirk argued that 
the “underlying concepts of [House Bill 1127] is so failing in merit 
that all of the technical problems are not worth addressing.”206 
Also, House Bill 1127 may have allowed commercial predators 
to unfairly benefit from research and development efforts of oth-
ers,207 by making vendors immune to contributory infringement or 
inducement of infringement.208  This benefit would have been to 
the detriment to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies 
because there would have been arguably little incentive to develop 
new uses for available products.209 
Moreover, because the legislative approach of House Bill 1127 
would have limited certain subject matter from patentability, vari-
 
202. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Kirk). 
203. See id. 
204. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of G. Lee Skillington). 
205. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Kirk) (arguing that the 
legislation would undesirably remove patent incentives and create an undesirable interna-
tional precedent). 
206. Id. 
207. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Baldino). 
208. See HARMON, supra note 54, at 238-243 (noting that both contributory in-
fringement and inducement of infringement require direct infringement). 
209. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Baldino). 
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ous commentators have expressed concern that the bill may have 
been in conflict with, and opposed to, our international position 
encouraging the expansion of patentable subject matter.  Although 
this approach may have been technically in accord with Article 27 
of the TRIPs Agreement,210 at least one commentator testifying be-
fore Congress argued that such exclusionary provisions were in-
cluded in the TRIPs agreement only at the urging of developing 
nations over the objections of the United States.211  Therefore, if 
the United States wishes to narrow or eliminate such exclusionary 
provisions, the United States should not simultaneously take ad-
vantage of them.212 
No Judiciary Committee markups were held on House Bill 
1127.  Nonetheless, by March of 1996, the House Bill 1127 had 
129 cosponsors, including 25 Democrats and 103 Republicans.213  
The biotechnology industry, however, wanted to add language to 
the bill to which the Medical Procedure Patents Coalition would 
not agree.214  Thus, the bill never passed into law. 
B. House Bill 3814 
In response to the criticisms of House Bill 1127, Representa-
tive Ganske introduced a modified version as an amendment to 
1997 appropriations legislation House Bill 3814.215  Unlike House 
Bill 1127, the Ganske amendment would have cut the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office’s funding in 1997 for issuing 
patents for new medical procedures, except as a necessary compo-
nent of a patentable medical device or machine.216 
 
210. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
211. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Kirk) (maintaining 
that Article 27 allows member nations to exclude diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical 
methods for the treatment of humans or animals as well as plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms). 
212. See id. 
213. See Garris, supra note 195, at 101 n.172. 
214. See Keven Murphy, Procedure Patent Bills Face Hefty Opposition, OCULAR 
SURGERY NEWS, Dec. 15, 1995, at 13. 
215. See 142 CONG. REC. H8030 (1996) (noting that Rep. Ganske “offered” House 
Bill 3814). 
216. See H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996). 
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1. Summary of House Bill 3814 
The Ganske amendment217 states that no funds made available 
by the appropriations bill could be used by the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office to issue medical procedure patents, includ-
ing methods for performing a surgical procedure,218 performing a 
medical procedure,219 or making a medical diagnosis.220  The 
amendment made two exceptions to this rule.221  The first excep-
tion was for a procedure performed by or as a necessary compo-
nent of a patentable machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter.222  The second exception occurred when the patent was for “a 
new use of a composition of matter or biotechnological proc-
ess.”223 
2. Comments on House Bill 3814 
Representative Ganske explained to the House of Representa-
tives that House Bill 3814 “borrows from and improves” the origi-
nal language of House Bill 1127.224  In particular, Representative 
 
217. Id.  House Bill 3814 is also referred to as the Ganske amendment because Rep-
resentative Ganske introduced it.  See 142 CONG. REC. H8030 (noting that Rep. Ganske 
“offered” House Bill 3814). 
218. H.R. 3814.  House Bill 3814 defines a surgical procedure as a “treatment for 
curing or preventing disease, injury, illness, disorder, or deformity by operative methods, 
in which human tissue is cut, burned, or vaporized by the use of any mechanical means, 
laser, or ionizing radiation, or the penetration of the skin or body orifice by any means.”  
Id. 
219. Id.  House Bill 3814 defines a medical procedure as a “nonsurgical, nondiag-
nostic procedure for curing or preventing a disease, injury, illness, disorder, or deform-
ity.”  Id. 
220. Id.  House Bill 3814 defines a medical diagnosis as the “identification of a 
medical condition or a disease or disorder of a body.”  Id. 
221. Id.  According to House Bill 3814, “[t]he limitation established in Subsection 
(a) shall not apply to the issuance of a patent when it is made known to the Federal offi-
cial having authority to obligate or expend such funds that . . . .”  Id. 
222. Id.  Under House Bill 3814, the exception occurs when: 
[T]he patent is for a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or im-
provement thereof, that is itself patentable subject matter, and the technique, 
method, or process referred to in Subsection (a) is performed by or is a neces-
sary component of the machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . . 
Id. 
223. Id. 
224. 142 CONG. REC. H8254, at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Ganske). 
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Ganske set out five policy reasons that the legislation should be 
supported.225  First, patient access to new surgical and medical pro-
cedures is being threatened by medical patents;226 second, medical 
patents permit patent owners to charge monopoly prices and 
contribute to our Nation’s health care costs;227 third, physicians 
have an obligation to share their knowledge and skills for the 
benefit of humanity;228 fourth, medial patents are not necessary for 
the advancement of medicine;229 and fifth, 80 countries around the 
world already prohibit medical patents.230 
Representative Ganske maintained that House Bill 3814 was 
different from House Bill 1127 because it would ensure that all 
“presently patentable new drugs . . . machinery and devices for 
treating and diagnosing disease . . . biologic products . . . new uses 
for nonpatentable drugs and biological products” would have re-
mained patentable.231  Representative Ganske also emphasized dur-
ing its introduction that the law, if the bill were passed, would not 
prohibit patents on gene therapy or other similar procedures.232  
Nonetheless, the biotechnology industry rejected the proposed leg-
islation because of a belief that it would “undermine the patenting 
of gene therapy treatments.”233 
Moreover, the legislation was opposed on procedural grounds 
because it was attached as a rider to the House appropriations bill, 
a non-substantive bill that funds the Departments of Commerce, 
Justice and State—a procedure that the Senate generally “es-
chews.”234  Accordingly, during the introduction of House Bill 
 
225. Id. 
226. See id. 
227. See id. 
228. See id. 
229. See id. 
230. See id. 
231. 142 CONG. REC. H8254, at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Ganske). 
232. Id.  Representative Ganske stated that House Bill 3814 contained “an addi-
tional exception for biotechnological process to make absolutely clear that this amend-
ment does not, let me repeat, does not prohibit patents on gene therapy or other similar 
procedures.”  Id. 
233. Bill with PTO Finding and Patent Reform on Medical Procedures Is Signed 
into Law, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), Oct. 7, 1996, at D5. 
234. BIO gets House backing on SBIR, but loses on procedure patents, 
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3814, various Representatives argued against inclusion of the Gan-
ske amendment on procedural grounds.235  Representative Rogers 
also argued that the Patent and Trademark Office had been con-
ducting public hearings on issues related to medical procedure pat-
ents and proposed that they should “address the issues raised by 
the legislation by modifying their internal, administrative proce-
dures.”236  However, this was not the case when Representative 
Ganske introduced his amendment.237 
House Bill 3814 was also opposed on substantive grounds, 
primarily on charges of being over broad and vague.238  Represen-
tative Dooley argued that the law was so broad that it would affect 
up to a third of all biotechnology patents in the United States.239  
One patent attorney considered the amendment so vague that he 
dubbed it the “patent lawyers full employment act.”240 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Aug. 19, 1996, at 3. 
235. See 142 CONG. REC. H8254, at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statements of 
Rep. Rogers, Rep. Moorhead, and Rep. Mollohan).  Representative Rogers agreed that it 
is “a very important subject that needs to be addressed by the authorization committee,” 
but he was “in reluctant opposition to the amendment . . . on a procedural basis . . . .”  Id.  
Representative Moorhead maintained that the amendment should be rejected because the 
“subject matter” of the bill was “within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee” and 
the problems addressed by the amendment might be better remedied by modifying the 
“internal, administrative procedures” at the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  
Id.  Representative Mollohan, in opposition to the amendment, argued that the amend-
ment was “not the appropriate [subject of this] bill” and “should best be decided by the 
authorizing committee.”  Id. 
236. 142 CONG. REC. H8254, at H8277 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. 
Rogers). 
237. See Bradley J. Meier, The New Patent Infringement Liability Exception for 
Medical Procedures, 23 J. LEGIS. 265, 272 (1997). 
238. See 142 CONG. REC. H8278.  According to Representative Dooley, the “lan-
guage is far too broad.”  Id. (statement of Rep. Dooley).  Representative Kennedy at-
tacked the language as well; while agreeing “with the underlying fundamental goal of this 
amendment,” he maintained that the bill was flawed because it bans all medical proce-
dure patents and “creates two somewhat vague exceptions.”  Id. (statement of Rep. Ken-
nedy).  Representative Kennedy also noted that the amendment “has been likened to cut-
ting one’s fingernails with a chain saw.”  Id.  In addition, Representative Schroeder 
argued “that the problems identified by the medical profession relating to patents on 
medical and surgical procedures can be solved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
through steps that are less drastic . . . .”  Id. (statement of Rep. Schroeder). 
239. Id. (statement of Rep. Dooley) (“The broad implications of the language 
threaten to invalidate up to one-third of all the biotech patents in the United States.”). 
240. Julie Rovner, Congress moves to restrict medical-procedure patents, LANCET, 
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An important difference between House Bill 1127 and the 
amendment contained in House Bill 3814 is that the amendment 
prevented the United States Patent and Trademark Office from us-
ing funds appropriated by the appropriations bill to issue patents on 
certain medical procedures, rather than prohibiting their issuance 
outright.241  Accordingly, the bill was criticized as not addressing 
the purported “underlying problem.”242  Also, the bill was an ap-
propriation bill for a single fiscal year, i.e., 1997, making it at best 
a temporary solution. 
On July 24, 1996, Ganske’s legislation was passed by the 
House243 as an amendment to the Commerce, Justice, State and Ju-
diciary Appropriations bill.244  The legislation, however, later died 
in the Senate.245 
B. Senate Bill 1334 
Due to the strong opposition to the approaches taken in House 
Bill 1127 and House Bill 3814, Senator Frist, in favor of limits on 
medical procedure patents, introduced Senate Bill 1334 as an alter-
native.246  Unlike the former approaches, which either limited the 
issuance of certain medical procedures or restricted funding for the 
granting of such patents, Senate Bill 1334 would have created an 
infringement liability exception for medical professionals using 
patented medical procedures.247 
 
Oct. 12, 1996, at 1025 (quoting David Schmickel, patent counsel for the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File. 
241. H.R. 3814, 104th Cong. (1996). 
242. Ganske Wins Ban on Licensing Medical Methods, HEALTH LEGISLATION & 
REGULATION, July 31, 1996 (noting that Senator Frist said that he “want[s] to treat the 
underlying problem, not stop funding one of the symptoms”), available in LEXIS, 
NEWS Library, ARCNWS File. 
243. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,023, at S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement 
of Sen. Frist) (noting that the legislation passed in a 295-128 vote). 
244. See id. 
245. See Meier, supra note 237, at 271. 
246. See 141 CONG REC. S15291, at S15291 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Frist) (noting that Senator Frist introduced Senate Bill 1334, also entitled the “Medi-
cal Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act”). 
247. S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995). 
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1. Summary of Senate Bill 1334 
Senate Bill 1334 would have amended section 271 of title 35 of 
United States Code by adding new subsection (j).248  The legisla-
tion stated that it would not be infringement for certain persons to 
use certain patented methods,249 or to use or induce others to use 
certain patented medical processes.250  The legislation also stated 
that it would not apply to patented procedures used by persons 
having a commercial interest in a regulated drug, medical device, 
process, or other product.251 
The terms “device” and “drug” would have the same meanings 
as the same terms defined in sections 201(h) and (g) of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.252  The terms “health care entity” 
and “licensed health care entity” would mean any entity that pro-
vides health care services.253  The terms “patient,” “physician,” 
“product,” “professionally affiliated with” and “state” were defined 
in various subsections of the legislation.254 
2. Comments on Senate Bill 1334 
Senate Bill 1334 was the subject of congressional testimony on 
October 19, 1995.  Senate Bill 1334 was criticized by a physician 
as an attempt to fix “a fundamentally unsound and conceptually 
flawed” proposal by narrowing its exclusionary provisions where 
there were “policy or political impediments to enactment of the 
legislation.”255 
It was also attacked because it provides physicians “unprece-
dented special rights to a professional group, giving them the ap-
 
248. See 141 CONG REC. S15291, at S15291 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Frist). 
249. S. 1334. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g), 321(h) (1994). 
253. S. 1334.  Under section 271(j)(2)(C) and (D), the terms “health care entity” 
and “licensed health care entity” means a “for-profit or nonprofit entity that provides 
health care services, including a hospital, medical school, health maintenance organiza-
tion, group medical practice, or a medical clinic.”  Id. 
254. Id. 
255. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,846 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Dr. 
Kirk). 
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pearance of being ‘above the law.’”256  One commentator also 
pointed out that for this reason, Senate Bill 1334 might conflict 
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.257  In fact, 
Senate Bill 1334 was dubbed “doubly discriminatory” because it 
discriminated based on the field of invention of technology and the 
identity or profession of the infringer.258 
According to some commentators, although Senate Bill 1334 
was not intended to immunize commercial suppliers, such suppli-
ers may exploit the immunity through health care entities under a 
literal interpretation of the bill.259  Senate Bill 1334 states that it is 
not infringement for “a health care entity with which a physician or 
licensed health care practitioner is professionally affiliated,” to use 
or induce others to use a patented technique.260  The term “health 
care entity,” means a “for-profit or non-profit entity that provides 
health care services.”261  Therefore, if a commercial interest would 
have provided materials used in a patented method performed by 
such a health care entity, that commercial interest may have been 
immune from infringement as well.262 
Even if a commercial interest was found liable for infringement 
under Senate Bill 1334, the result may be inequitable.263  In par-
ticular, the term “health care entity” may include a person “en-
gaged in a commercial sale.”264  In that case, it may have been in-
equitable for a willfully infringing health care entity, such as a 
health management organization buyer of drugs, not to share liabil-
 
256. Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Noonan). 
257. See Garris, supra note 195, at 104. 
258. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Mr. 
Hatch letter); see also Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Noonan) 
(arguing that the approach of 1334 is “unpalatable because it grants unprecedented spe-
cial rights to a professional group, giving them the appearance of being ‘above the law,’ 
and inviting other groups to claim similar immunity”). 
259. See Murnane & Kole, supra note 22, at C19. 
260. S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995). 
261. Id. 
262. See Murnane & Kole, supra note 22, at C19 (“It is not difficult to imagine sce-
narios in which the health care entity, which may be for-profit or non-profit, enters into a 
lucrative relationship with a commercial supplier that provides materials used in the pat-
ented method.”). 
263. Id. 
264. S. 1334. 
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ity with the commercial interest, the manufacturer of those 
drugs.265 
Furthermore, some commentators argue that Senate Bill 1334 
may have been ambiguous as to whether a physician participating 
in the sale of a medical product would have been exempted from 
the immunity granted to physicians by the bill.266  Although a per-
son participating in the sale of certain regulated products or proc-
esses is exempt from immunity, the bill does not require these 
regulated products or processes to be related to any patented 
method.267  Therefore, a physician may be immune to patent in-
fringement, even when that doctor participates in the sale of unre-
lated patented medical products.268 
A possible advantage to Senate Bill 1334 over the other ver-
sions of legislation is that it would only have limited the enforce-
ability, not prohibited the issuance, of such patents, thereby having 
the benefit of not affecting the procedures of the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office.269 
Senate Bill 1334 may have also been superior to House Bill 
1127 because the approach taken in Senate Bill 1334 was arguably 
more consistent with the approach taken in section 271(c) of title 
35 of the United states Code—the related patent statute.270  Section 
271(c), also known as the “clinical trial exemption,” states that it is 
not an act of infringement to use or sell a patented invention solely 
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under federal laws that regulate drugs or veterinary 
biological products.271  Like section 271(c), Senate Bill 1334 states 
that it is not an act of infringement for certain individuals to use or 
induce others to use certain medical methods.272  Therefore, like 
 
265. See Murnane & Kole, supra note 22, at C19. 
266. See id. 
267. See id. (“The Frist bill exempts from immunity any person engaged in the 
commercial manufacture, sale or offer for sale of regulated drugs, medical devices or 
processes, without linking such items with the patented method to which immunity is at-
tached.”). 
268. See id. 
269. S. 1334 
270. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Mr. Kelman). 
271. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1) (1994). 
272. S. 1334. 
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section 271(c), Senate Bill 1334 exempts certain acts from being 
acts of infringement.273 
The remedy restrictive approach, however, taken by Senate Bill 
1334 may not achieve an important intended result of the legisla-
tion—the prevention of lawsuits against medical practitioners for 
the practice of patented medical procedures.274  Because expensive 
discovery proceedings would probably have been required before 
the merits of the case could be judged, the legislation likely would 
not have provided the relief sought by practitioners.275  One com-
mentator argued that Senate Bill 1334 would actually increase liti-
gation through a combination of a failure to reduce existing litiga-
tion and additional litigation over the meaning and effort of the 
legislation itself.276 
Furthermore, House Bill 1334 may not have precluded en-
forcement against those involved in the commercial manufacture 
of drugs or medical devices “subject to the regulation under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Domestic Act or the Public Health Ser-
vice Act.”277  In effect, this approach would have provided patent 
protection only to medical methods that require approval by the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).  Because this approach 
would have made patentable only those medical procedures subject 
to regulatory review—thus making the scope of patentable protec-
tion flexible—the approach was arguably superior to House Bill 
1127 and House Bill 3814.278  The approach, however, may be 
flawed because some believed it to undesirably expand the scope 
of FDA review to reach the medical practice.279 
 
273. Id.  Unlike Section 271(c), however, the acts defined by Senate Bill 1334 are 
not related to government regulation.  Id. 
274. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,846 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from 
Dr. Kirk). 
275. See id. 
276. See id. 
277. H.R. 1334. 
278. See Hearings on H.R. 1127, supra note 20 (statement of Dr. Noonan) (“The 
scope of patent protection would also be flexible, and could expand if the jurisdiction of 
the FDA was enlarged.”). 
279. See id.; see also 142 CONG. REC. S12,023, at S12,023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 
1996) (statement of Sen. Frist).  According to Senator Frist, such legislation would “in-
ject patent-seeking in the heart of medicine” and “undermine the peer review process,” 
thereby opening the door for more expansive FDA regulation.  142 CONG. REC. S12,023, 
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D. Senate Bill 2105 
On September 24, 1996, Senator Frist introduced a bill that he 
believed struck a balance between various competing interests.280  
On one hand, Senator Frist believed that medical patents, other 
than for procedures, required patent protection to attract capital for 
research and development.281  On the other hand, he worried that 
patent infringement suits involving doctors and other health care 
professionals would have several undesirable consequences.282  In 
any case, Senate Bill 2105 died before making it to the House. 
E. Section 616 of House Bill 3610 
Although Senate Bill 2105 never passed into law itself, it initi-
ated a legislation chain reaction that led to section 287(c).283  Its 
passage into law took less than one week and included language 
not in any previous bill.284 
On September 28, 1996, with a vote of 370 to 37, House Bill 
3610 was passed by the House after an all-night session.285  During 
that session, the House chose not to amend the bill, opting to pass 
it without amendment to the Senate for consideration.286  Because 
House Bill 3610 was sent to the Senate as a conference agreement, 
 
at S12023 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Frist).  Senator Frist also noted 
that, “[w]hile the FDA regulates medical devices and pharmaceuticals, it has no authority 
to regulate the general practice of medicine . . . .”  Id. 
280. See id. 
281. Id. 
282. Id.  According to Senator Frist, patent infringement suits involving health care 
practitioners may lead to undesirable results.  Id.  First, health care costs could explode if 
doctors charged licensing fees for every new surgical or medical techniques they devel-
oped.  See id.  Second, it could greatly jeopardize patients’ rights to privacy.  See id.  In 
order to know if a patent was infringed upon, patent holders could demand access to sur-
gical notes and other detailed medical records to know precisely which procedures were 
used.  See id.  Third, allowing pure procedure patents could undermine the medical com-
munity’s tradition of freely exchanging information for the benefit of patients.  See id.  
And fourth, it could open the door to FDA regulation of all aspects of medical practice, 
instead of the current regulation of only medical devices and pharmaceuticals.  See id. 
283. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
284. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,049, at S12,049 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1996) (statement of 
Mr. Lott). 
285. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,815, at S11,816 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement 
of Mr. Lott). 
286. See id. 
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it could not be amended; it was only subject to an up or down 
vote.287  The Senate passed House Bill 4278 on September 30, by a 
vote of 84-15,288 and also passed House Bill 3610, which was 
signed by the President that evening.289  House Bill 3610 contained 
section 287(c), which deprives owners of medical procedure pat-
ents the right to seek damages or injunctive relief when such pat-
ents are infringed by certain health care providers.290 
1. Summary of Section 287(c) 
Section 287(c)(1) provides “medical practitioners” engaged in 
“medical activity” with immunity from the provisions contained in 
sections 271, 281, 283, 284, and 285.291  Under section 
287(c)(2)(A), the term “medical activity” is defined as the “per-
formance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body,” but does 
not include the use of patented machines, practices, or processes.292  
Section 287(c)(2)(B) defines the term “medical practitioner” to 
mean “any natural person who is licensed by a State to provide the 
medical activity described in Subsection 287(c)(1) or who is acting 
under the direction of such a person in the performance of the 
medical activity.”293  Section 287(c)(2)(C) defines the term “re-
 
287. See id. 
288. See 142 CONG. REC. S12,049, at S12,049 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1996) (statement of 
Mr. Lott). 
289. See id. 
290. H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. (1996). 
291. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1).  Section 287(c)(1) states that: 
With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance, of a medical activity that 
constitutes an infringement under Section 271 (a) or (b) of this title, the provi-
sions of Sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 of this title shall not apply against the 
medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such 
medical activity. 
Id. 
292. Id. § 287(c)(2)(A).  Section 287(c)(2)(A) defines the term “medical activity” to 
mean “performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body,” but does not include: 
(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in vio-
lation of such patent, 
(ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such 
patent, or 
(iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent. 
Id. 
293. Id. § 287(c)(2)(B). 
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lated health care entity” as “an entity with which a medical practi-
tioner has a professional affiliation under which the medical practi-
tioner performs the medical activity.”294  Under section 
287(c)(2)(D), the term “professional affiliation” is defined as “staff 
privileges, medical staff membership, employment of contractual 
relation, partnership or ownership interest, academic appointment, 
or their affiliation under which a medical practitioner provides the 
medical activity on behalf of, or in association with, the health care 
entity.”295  Section 287(c)(2)(E) defines the term “body” as a “hu-
man body, organ or cadaver, or a nonhuman animal used in medi-
cal research or instruction directly relating to the treatment of hu-
mans.”296  According to section 287(c)(2)(F), the term “patented 
use of a composition of matter” does not include “a claim for a 
method of performing a medical or surgical procedure on a body 
that recites the use of a composition of matter where the use of that 
composition of matter does not directly contribute to achievement 
of the objective of the claimed method.”297  Section 287(c)(2)(G) 
defines the term “state” as “any state or territory of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico.”298 
Section 287(c)(3) exempts certain activities performed by 
commercial interests from section 287(c).299  Specifically, “persons 
engaged in the commercial development, manufacture, sale, impor-
tation, or distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory ser-
vices . . . .”300  Section 287(c)(3)(A) and (B) defines the type of ex-
empted activities.301  According to section 287(c)(3)(A), the ex-
empted activity must be “directly related” to certain commercial 
 
294. Id. § 287(c)(2)(C).  Section 287(c)(2)(C) further defines a related health care 
entity as “including, but not limited to, nursing home, hospital university, medical school, 
health maintenance organization, group medical practice, or a medical clinic.”  Id. 
295. Id. § 287(c)(2)(D). 
296. Id. § 287(c)(2)(E). 
297. Id. § 287(c)(2)(F). 
298. Id. § 287(c)(2)(G). 
299. Id. § 287(c)(3). 
300. Id. 
301. Id. §§ 287(c)(3)(A), 287(c)(3)(B). 
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activities.302  Under section 287(c)(3)(B), the exempted activity 
must also be “regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act, the Public Health Service Act, or the Clinical Laborato-
ries Improvement Act.”303 
2. House Report 2702 
According to House Report 2702, section 287(c) is intended to 
“preclude the filing of civil action” for damages or injunctive relief 
“against a medical practitioner” or a “related health care entity” 
who performs a medical activity that would otherwise constitute an 
infringement or inducement to infringe under section 271.304  Un-
der section 287(c)(2)(A), there are three exceptions to the defini-
tion of “medical activity.”305 
The House Report explained that the term “patented use of a 
composition of matter,” under section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii), is limited 
by section 287(c)(2)(F)306 and, under section 287(c)(2)(F), does not 
include any claim for performing a medical or surgical procedure 
on a body that recites the use of the composition of matter where 
the use of the composition of matter does not “directly contribute” 
to the achievement of the objective of the claimed method.307 
Also, the House Report explained that a use of a composition 
of matter as a step in a claim “will direct[ly] contribute” to the 
achievement of the objective of the claimed method if it is “novel 
or if it contributes to or is necessary to establish the non-
obviousness of the claim as a whole.”308  In addition, when each of 
the method steps in a method claim recites a “use of a composition 
 
302. Id. § 287(c)(3)(A).  According to section 287(c)(3)(A), the activity must be 
“directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or dis-
tribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of phar-
macy or clinical laboratory services (other than clinical laboratory services provided in a 
physician’s office) . . . .”  Id. 
303. Id. § 287(c)(3)(B).  According to section 287(c)(3)(B), the activity exempted 
by section 287(c)(3) must also be “regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, the Public Health Service Act, or the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act.”  Id. 
304. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
305. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (c)(2)(A). 
306. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
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of matter,” the claim cannot represent a “medical activity” because 
the use of a composition of matter must necessarily contribute to 
the novelty and, therefore, to the objective of the claimed 
method.309  Moreover, “[u]ses of compositions of matter” include, 
without limitation, a wide variety of novel uses and methods.310  
The House Report offered the treatment for diabetes as an example 
of a claim that does not fall within the scope of a “medical activ-
ity.”311 
The House Report also introduces the concept of a “hybrid” 
claim.312  In order to determine whether a “hybrid” claim is ex-
empted from the definition of a “medical activity,” the test estab-
lished by section 287(c)(2)(F) must be applied.313  The hybrid 
claim is not a “medical activity” when it includes the patented use 
of a composition of matter that directly contributes to the objective 
of the claim.314 
The test set forth in the House Report has two parts.315  Before 
applying the two-part test, however, the hybrid claim must be di-
vided into (1) steps that recite the use of composition of matter, 
namely, composition steps, and (2) steps that do not recite the use 
of a composition of matter, namely, procedure steps.316  The first 
part of the test determines the objective of the claimed method tak-
ing into account all of the process steps set forth in the claim.317  
The second part of the test determines “whether the steps involving 
 
309. Id. 
310. Id.  The House Report expressly included the following novel uses and meth-
ods:  “novel uses of drugs, novel uses of chemical or biological reagents for diagnostic 
purposes, novel methods for scheduling or timing administration of drugs, novel methods 
for combining drug therapies, and novel methods for providing genetic or other biologi-
cal materials to a patient (including gene therapies).”  Id. 
311. Id.  The example claim recites that “only the novel use of a drug for the treat-
ment of diabetes that involves the administration of a drug at a particular time of day 
and/or at a specified dose and/or with a specified concomitant medicinal therapy could 
not be construed as a medical activity.”  Id. 
312. Id.  The House Report defines a hybrid claim to be “a claim with at least one 
step that recites the use of a composition of matter and at least one step that is not di-
rected to the use of a composition of matter (e.g., a surgical step) . . . .”  Id. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
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the use of one or more compositions of matter either alone or in 
combination contribute directly to the achievement of the objective 
of the claimed method.”318 
According to the House Report, when the “uses of the compo-
sitions of matter, either individually or collectively, represents 
novel subject matter, or if one or more of these steps contributes to 
or are necessary to establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a 
whole,” the hybrid claim is not a medical activity.319  Therefore, 
when one or more steps that use compositions of matter are com-
bined with one or more steps that involve collectively obvious 
medical or surgical techniques to produce a novel and non-obvious 
method, the ones that use compositions of matter “may still di-
rectly contribute,” as defined by section 287(c)(2)(F), thereby mak-
ing the hybrid claim exempt from section 287(c).320 
Section 287(c)(2)(A) provides for procedures that do not con-
stitute a “medical activity.”321  The House Report provided an ex-
ample of a surgical procedure that qualifies as a medical activ-
ity.322  The example involves the transplantation of a healthy heart 
into a patient with a diseased heart, including “administering a 
conventional anesthetic” and performing “a novel and non-obvious 
surgical transplantation procedure.”323  Under the test set forth in 
the House Report, that procedure is not a patented use of a compo-
sition of matter within the meaning of section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).324  
Therefore, assuming none of the other exceptions apply,325 the sur-
gical procedure qualifies as a “medical activity.”  In contrast, the 
House Report explains that “where the administration of the anes-
 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Id.  According to House Report 104-2702: 
[E]ven where the steps involving uses of one or more compositions of matter 
are not novel individually or in combination with each other, these uses may 
still directly contribute to the achievement of the objective of the claimed 
method if, in combination with the steps that involve collectively obvious 
medical or surgical techniques, they produce a novel and non-obvious method. 
Id. 
321. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A). 
322. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
323. Id. 
324. Id. 
325. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 287(c)(2)(A)(i), 287(c)(2)(A)(ii), 287(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
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thesia was accomplished . . . using a novel anesthetic or a novel 
dosing schedule,” the procedure would fall within the meaning of 
section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) and the procedure would not qualify as a 
medical activity.326 
The House Report also purports that the determination of 
whether section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) applies, can be decided by a mo-
tion to dismiss or summary judgment,327 and proposes a two-
pronged test for making such a determination.328  An accused in-
fringer would “ordinarily prevail” under the two prong test if the 
accused infringer can show “by clear and convincing evidence” 
that the recited uses of the compositions of matter, both individu-
ally and collectively, lack novelty, and “by a preponderance of the 
evidence” that the medical or surgical procedure steps are, by 
themselves, novel and non-obvious, thereby allowing the accused 
infringer to concede non-obviousness instead of making the re-
quired evidentiary showing.329 
Section 287(c)(2)(A)(iii) excludes from the definition of 
“medical activity” the practice of a patented process in violation of 
a biotechnology patent.330  The House Report explains that for 
purposes of this provision, the definition of the term “biotechnol-
ogy patent” includes patents on a (1) “biotechnological process” as 
defined in section 103(b), and (2) the “process of making or using 
 
326. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).  According to House Report 104-2702, 
“the objective of the claimed method would include the provision of a novel use of an 
anesthetic in transplantation surgery and the use of the composition of matter (i.e., the 
anesthetic) would directly contribute to the achievement of the objective.”  Id. 
327. Id. (“It is intended that the applicability of the exception in 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) for 
a patented use of a composition of matter can usually be decided by a motion to dismiss 
or summary judgment under Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.”). 
328. Id. 
329. Id.  The House Report notes that the movant must show: 
(1) . . . by clear and convincing evidence that the recited uses of the composi-
tions of matter, both individually and collectively, lack novelty, and 
(2) . . . by a preponderance of the evidence that the steps of the claimed method 
that do not involve uses of compositions of matter (i.e., the medical or surgical 
procedure steps) are, by themselves, novel and non-obvious, provided, how-
ever, that the movant may concede the non-obviousness in lieu of making the 
required evidentiary showing. 
Id. 
330. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
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biological materials, including treatment using those materials, 
where those materials have been manipulated ex vivo at the cellu-
lar or molecular level.”331  Moreover, “biological materials” in-
clude “a variety of cellular, intracellular, extracellular, and acellu-
lar substances.”332  Additionally, “ex vivo manipulation” includes 
“propagation, expansion, selection, purification, pharmaceutical 
treatment, or alteration of the biological characteristics of these 
substances outside of a human body.”333  Therefore, medical pro-
cedures that do not involve ex vivo cellular or molecular manipula-
tion of a biological material are excluded from section 
287(c)(2)(iii).334  The House Report explains that a heart transplan-
tation surgery that includes the use of a heart-lung machine is ex-
cluded from section 287(c)(2)(iii) because the manipulation is not 
ex vivo, and not at the cellular or molecular level.335 
3. Comments on Section 287(c) 
The Medical Procedure Patents Coalition, again led by the So-
ciety of Cataract and Refractive Surgery, supported the legisla-
tion.336  Specifically, the Medical Procedure Patents Coalition sup-
ported the language exempting certain activities relating to 
 
331. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
332. Id.  According to House Report 104-2702: 
Cellular substances include (but are not limited to) cultured microbial and 
mammalian cells.  Intracellular substances include (but are not limited to) ge-
netic materials, such as DNA and RNA that is obtained from within the cell.  
Extracellular substances include (but are not limited to) proteins and other 
molecules that are secreted or excreted by cells.  Acellular substances include 
(but are not limited to) viruses and other vectors for transmitting genetic mate-
rial. 
Id. 
333. Id. 
334. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(iii). 
335. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
336. See Medical Patent Bill, supra note 12.  The other members of the Medical 
Procedure Patents Coalition are the American Academy of Dermatology, American 
Academy of Ophthalmology, American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, American 
Academy of Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery, American Association of Neuro-
logical Surgery, American College of Radiology, American College of Surgeons, Ameri-
can Institute of Ultrasound in Medicine, American Medical Association, American Soci-
ety of Dermatologic Surgery, American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, 
American Urological Association, Association of American Medical Colleges, Society of 
Cardiovascular and Interventional Surgery, and the Society of Vascular Technology.  Id. 
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commercial development and distribution and provision of phar-
macy or clinical laboratory services, which effectively broadened 
the exemption already objected to by Dr. Kirk.337 
One aspect of the legislation related to claims involving the 
patented use of a composition of matter.  This aspect narrows the 
scope of the exemption by requiring that that use “directly contrib-
ute to [the] achievement of the objective of the claimed 
method.”338  According to Dr. Kirk, this aspect of the legislation 
was a matter of fact, and thus unlikely to be resolved at the plead-
ings or motion stages of litigation.339  Therefore, for the same rea-
sons that Senate Bill 1334 would not have avoided costly and time-
consuming litigation between physicians, this legislation would not 
have as well.340 
Legislative proponents, however, argued that the history of the 
legislation would establish the clear legislative intent required to 
resolve such fact intensive matters by motion to dismiss or sum-
mary judgment.341  Nevertheless, as Dr. Kirk testified, legislative 
history is not controlling when in conflict with the rules of civil 
procedure.342  For example, a proponent suggests that a movant for 
summary judgment under Rule 56343 should ordinarily prevail if 
certain essential facts are shown by a “preponderance of the evi-
dence.”344  According to Dr. Kirk, however, such a suggestion ex-
pressly conflicts with Rule 56, which states that a party should 
prevail only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.”345 
According to a letter written by Senator Orrin Hatch, there 
were too many unresolved issues to “sweep” the legislation into an 
end-of-the-session omnibus appropriations bill.346  In particular, 
 
337. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,846 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Dr. 
Kirk). 
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
340. See id. 
341. See id. 
342. Id. 
343. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
344. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,846 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Dr. 
Kirk). 
345. Id. 
346. 142 CONG. REC. S11,845, at S11,845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter from Mr. 
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Senator Hatch objected to the amendment on procedural grounds 
because the proposal was never the subject of hearings or amend-
ments in either the House or Senate.347  Senator Hatch also ob-
jected to the legislation because of its undesirable precedent setting 
nature for United States trade policy.348 
III. SECTION 287(C) IS VAGUE, DISCRIMINATORY, AND INEFFECTIVE 
This Note proposes a three-part analytic framework for deter-
mining whether a defendant should be granted relief under section 
287(c)(1).  It analyzes two exemplary medical procedure patents 
under this proposed framework and identifies problems inherent in 
the current statute.  The proposed framework is necessary because 
section 287(c) is vague, discriminatory, and ineffective at solving 
the purported problems that motivated its enactment. 
A. Analytical Framework 
This Note proposes the following three-part analytical frame-
work for determining whether a party is entitled to relief under sec-
tion 287(c)(1). 
1. “With Respect to a Medical Practitioner” 
The first part of the three-part analysis involves determining 
whether the performance of an accused infringer is “with respect to 
a medical practitioner.”349  This determination depends upon 
whether the defendant is a medical practitioner.350  Section 
287(c)(2)(B) provides that the term “medical practitioner” encom-
pass any person licensed by a state to provide the medical activity 
described in section 287(c)(1), or any person acting under the di-
rection of such a person in the performance of the medical activ-
ity.351  If the performance by an accused infringer is not “with re-
 
Hatch letter). 
347. Id. (noting that there was no “purported emergency”). 
348. Id.  According to Senator Hatch, the Senate Finance and House Ways and 
Means Committees should have consulted with the United States Trade Representative 
before this legislation was brought up for a vote.  Id. 
349. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (1996). 
350. See id. 
351. § 287(c)(2). 
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spect to a medical practitioner’s performance,” a defendant cannot 
seek relief under section 287(c)(1).352 
2. “A Medical Activity” 
The second part of the three-part analysis determines whether 
the claimed procedure is directed to “a medical activity.”  A medi-
cal activity is a medical or surgical procedure on a body.  Under 
section 287(c)(2)(E), a body must be human or nonhuman.353  If 
nonhuman, the body must be used in research or instruction “di-
rectly relating to the treatment of humans.”354  Therefore, a per-
formance on a “human” body would be a medical activity, but the 
same performance on a “nonhuman” body would likely generate 
substantial litigation depending on how “directly related” that per-
formance is to the treatment of humans.355 
The term “medical activities” does not cover three circum-
stances.356  The three exceptions are the use of a patented machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such a pat-
ent, the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in 
violation of such a patent, and the practice of a process in violation 
of a biotechnology patent.357 
According to the exception in section 287(c)(2)(A)(i), a “medi-
cal activity” does not include the use of patented technology such 
as a “patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in 
violation of such patent.”358  Although not yet addressed in the 
case law, patented technology apparently could be covered by an-
other claim in the same patent as the one also claiming the medical 
procedure or in a claim of an entirely different patent. 
The question of whether a medical procedure uses a patented 
 
352. § 287(c)(1). 
353. Id. § 287(c)(2)(E). 
354. Id. 
355. See discussion supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (describing the term 
experimental use).  A better approach to protecting experimental and research use would 
be analogous to the experimental use exception under section 102(b), 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), 
which is already established and substantially tested. 
356. § 287(c)(2)(A) (1996). 
357. Id. 
358. § 287(c)(2)(A)(i). 
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technology would likely be answered in a two-step inquiry analo-
gous to the conventional two-step infringement inquiry set forth in 
Markman.359  This two-step procedure would first require estab-
lishing the meaning and scope of the claimed “patented technol-
ogy,” and then a comparison of the properly construed meaning 
and scope of the claimed “patented technology” with the activity 
and equipment use of the medical practitioner.  The first step 
would be used to determine if any patented technology exists360 
and then to establish the meaning and scope of any claims to any 
such patented technology.  The second step would determine 
whether the performance of the medical practitioner is in violation 
of that patented technology.  Thus, a medical practitioner seeking 
relief under section 287(c)(1) might be required to prove non-
infringement of other patented technologies conceivably embodied 
in any of several unrelated patents.361  Alternatively, the patentee 
may be required to prove that the exception applies after the medi-
cal practitioner proves a prima facie case.  In either case, there ap-
pears to be an additional litigation burden on the medical practitio-
ner. 
Any Markman-like inquiry would likely be time-consuming 
and expensive.  Taking guidance from Markman, the first question 
to be addressed under section 287(c) regarding the meaning and 
scope of the patent claim would be a matter of law,362 and the sec-
ond question regarding the comparison of the properly construed 
claims with the physician’s performance of the medical practitio-
ner would be a question of fact, to be submitted to a jury.363  Al-
though the first question is a question of law, a court can use in-
trinsic and extrinsic evidence in deciding that question.364  Such 
 
359. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
360. The term “patented” in this context is vague.  It is unclear whether the term 
refers to technology covered by any patent or just by United States patents.  Also, it is 
uncertain whether the term includes enforceable patents only.  If so, it appears that this 
exception would illogically and inequitably depend on the enforceable status of one or 
more completely independent patents. 
361. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). 
362. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
363. See id. 
364. See id. at 979. 
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evidence includes patents, their prosecution histories,365 and any 
evidence external to the patents and prosecution histories, includ-
ing expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned trea-
tises.366 
Thus, determining the answer to the threshold question of the 
meaning and scope of a patented technology may pose a substan-
tial burden on the physician.  Moreover, determining the answer to 
the second question by comparing the meaning and scope with the 
practitioner’s performance, which is purely a matter of fact, may 
impose an even higher litigation burden on the medical practitio-
ner.  The analysis required to determine the answers to those ques-
tions would likely require substantial resources on behalf of the 
medical practitioner defendant.  This is in contrast to section 
287(c)’s proponents’ purported objective of preventing the rise in 
cost of health care.367 
In fact, coupling a defendant’s immunity in a medical proce-
dure patent infringement suit to another patent infringement un-
fairly and unreasonably increases the burden on the practitioner.  
In order to avoid infringement of a medical procedure patent, a 
medical practitioner may be required to argue non-infringement of 
a second unrelated patent.  This is without precedent.  In addition 
to increasing the burden on the medical practitioner, the pairing is 
undesirable because it provides a motive for medical patent owners 
to instigate additional unrelated patent infringement suits.  The in-
centive to file additional suits surely could not have been an in-
tended result of section 287(c)(1).368 
According to the exception in section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii), a medi-
cal activity does not include “the practice of a patented use of a 
composition of matter in violation of such patent.”369  In contrast to 
the first exception, which concerns the use of patented technology, 
 
365. See id. 
366. See id. at 980 (“This evidence may be helpful to explain scientific principles, 
the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that appear in the patent and prosecution 
history.  Extrinsic evidence may demonstrate the state of the prior art at the time of the 
invention.”). 
367. See Scerra, supra note 18, at 28. 
368. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). 
369. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
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the second exception concerns the patented use of a composition of 
matter.370 
The term “patented use of a composition of matter” is limited 
by subsection 287(c)(2)(F),371 which states that a patented use does 
not include a patented method that uses a composition of matter 
not “directly contribut[ing]” to the achievement of the claimed 
method’s objective.372  The House Report states that a patented use 
will directly contribute if that use is “itself novel or if it contributes 
to or is necessary to establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a 
whole.”373  Thus, to show that a use “directly contributes,” the de-
fendant may have to prove that the use of the composition of mat-
ter is not itself novel or does not contribute to or is not necessary to 
establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a whole.374 
If a medical practitioner fails to prove that the use of the com-
position of matter in a step of the claim does not contribute to or is 
not necessary to establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a 
whole, the defendant’s case may be harmed while the patentee’s 
case is advanced.  This result may arise because the defendant may 
undesirably establish that the remaining portion of the claim is 
non-obvious.  In other words, medical practitioners would have lit-
tle incentive to prove that the use of the composition of matter does 
not contribute to or is not necessary to establish the non-
obviousness of the claim as a whole, and patentees would corre-
spondingly not endeavor to prove the opposite.375  This strange re-
sult suggests that the proposed method for resolving whether a use 
 
370. Id. 
371. § 287(c)(2)(F).  According to section 287(c)(2)(F): 
The term “patented use of a composition of matter” does not include a claim for 
a method of performing a medical or surgical procedure on a body that recites 
the use of a composition of matter where the use of that composition of matter 
does not directly contribute to achievement of the objective of the claimed 
method. 
Id. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. (“A use of a composition of matter as a step in a claim will directly contrib-
ute to the achievement of the objective of the claimed method if it is itself novel or if it 
contributes to or is necessary to establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a whole.”). 
374. Id. 
375. Moreover, a party would be averse to challenging novelty because of the heavy 
burden of showing identity between prior art and the claimed invention. 
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“directly contributes” is untenable. 
Moreover, no provision except section 287(c) makes the rem-
edy available to a patent owner in any way contingent on less than 
all of the steps of a claim.376  In fact, nowhere else does the pat-
entabilty or enforceability of a claim depend solely on the novelty 
or non-obviousness of a step; they always depend on the claim 
when taken “as a whole.”377  Indeed, proving the novelty or non-
obviousness, or lack thereof, of one or more individual steps places 
a burden on the patentee, or the medical practitioner, respectively, 
that is even greater than the burden already met by the patentee in 
order to obtain the patent.  At least for this reason, the novel and 
non-obviousness step test places an unprecedented burden on liti-
gants that both contravenes logic and departs completely from tra-
ditional American patent law. 
The House Report also suggests an undesirable strategy for de-
termining whether a “performance of a medical or surgical proce-
dure” falls within the exception defined by section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) 
for two categories of claims.378  The first category includes medi-
cal procedure claims in which every step of the claim recites a “use 
of a composition of matter.”379  The second category includes 
medical procedure claims having at least one step that recites such 
a use and at least one step that does not.380  The House Report re-
fers to those claims as “hybrid” claims.381  The strategy is undesir-
able because the applicability of the exception under section 
287(c)(2)(A)(ii) hinges on the vagaries of claim drafting, rather 
than on the substantive issue of whether the claim is directed to an 
intended type of medical performance.382 
Furthermore, the House Report submits that a claim in the first 
category “cannot represent a ‘medical activity’ because the use of a 
composition of matter [in each of the method steps] must necessar-
ily contribute to the novelty and, therefore, to the objective of the 
 
376. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
377. O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 149. 
378. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
379. Id. 
380. See id. 
381. Id. 
382. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
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claimed method.”383  The House Report lists a series of qualifying 
examples of “uses of compositions of matter,” but states that the 
list is not exhaustive, and specifically qualifies the list with the 
phrase “includes, without limitation.”384  The House Report pro-
vides an example of a claim that uses a composition of matter that 
is not a medical activity, that is, one that recites only the novel use 
of a drug for the treatment of diabetes involving the administration 
of a drug at a particular time or at a certain dose or with a specified 
concomitant medicinal therapy.385  The House Report gives no ex-
amples, and thus gives no guidance, as to when a use would not 
qualify.386 
The House Report incorrectly asserts that the use of a composi-
tion of matter in “each” claimed step must mean that it directly 
contributes to the achievement of the objective.387  This is because 
the claim draftsperson may have included the use of the composi-
tion of matter in each step unnecessarily, or even inadvertently.388  
The claim’s novelty may reside in an aspect of the steps other than 
the use of the composition of matter, especially because the claim 
was considered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
with respect to the claim as a whole,389 not with respect to a par-
ticular use of a composition of matter. 
For example, every step of a surgical claim might use a compo-
sition of matter because it is preferable, not because it contributes 
to the novelty of the claim or the achievement of its objective.  To 
illustrate, each step of a surgical technique might include “flush-
ing” a region with water or saline solution.  Flushing water would 
be a use of a composition of matter.  In this case, however, the 
flushing may merely improve the results of the otherwise novel 
claim. 
 
383. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702. 
384. Id. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. 
387. Id. 
388. This rule provides a clever patent prosecutor a means to evade section 
287(c)(A)(1) by merely adding conventional uses of such compositions to each step in 
claim.  This would be particularly simple in single step procedure claims where the use of 
a flushing agent would be standard practice. 
389. See O’Shaughnessy, supra note 32, at 149. 
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The House Report submits that a claim in the second category, 
a hybrid claim, has “at least one step that recites the use of a com-
position of matter and at least one step that is not directed to the 
use of a composition of matter.”390  A two-step test for analyzing a 
hybrid claim is included in the House Report.391  The first step is to 
determine “the objective of the claimed method taking into account 
all of the process steps set forth in the claim.”392  The second step 
is to “determine whether the [claimed] steps involving the use of 
one or more compositions of matter either alone or in combination 
contribute directly to the achievement of the objective of the 
claimed method.”393 
In practice, neither determination would be easy.  The first step 
involves determining only one objective of the claimed method.394  
This task may be difficult—or even impossible—because a single 
invention may have many objectives.395  The second step involves 
determining whether the claimed steps involving the use of the 
compositions of matter alone or in combination directly contribute 
to the achievement of the objective found in the first step.396  Such 
a determination would be unprecedented, requiring detailed analy-
sis on the level of one or more steps.  The question whether any 
claimed steps “directly contribute to the achievement of the objec-
tive” is entirely new.  Therefore, the process of answering such a 
question would likely require litigation. 
Yet another significant problem with the House Report’s cate-
gorical approach is its undesirable dependence on the structure of 
the claim at issue.397  Claim drafting is an art, and the structure of a 
claim is flexible.  What constitutes a claimed “step” is in many 
 
390. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996); see also supra note 320 (quoting House 
Report 104-2702). 
391. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
392. Id. 
393. Id. 
394. Id. 
395. Often, multiple objectives of an invention are listed in the summary of the in-
vention.  See, e.g., Method of Preventing Repetitive Stress Injuries During Computer 
Keyboard Usage, United States Patent No. 5,638,831 (issued June 17, 1997) [hereinafter 
Repetitive Stress Patent] (including fifteen objects of the invention). 
396. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
397. Id. 
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cases merely a matter of how the claim was drafted.398  Thus, the 
question as to whether “each of the method steps” includes the use 
of a composition of matter could be compounded by the additional 
question of what constitutes a step.399 
For example, a method claim includes one or more steps, but 
each of the steps may itself be a combination of sub-steps.  The 
difference between a step and a sub-step is often a matter of for-
mality, with no substantive basis.  Thus, a two-step claim, includ-
ing one step that recites the use of a composition of matter and one 
step that does not, could be combined into a one-step claim having 
two sub-steps.400  Determining whether such a two-step claim is a 
“medical activity” requires the two-step analysis suggested by the 
House Report.401  If the form of the claim were changed, however, 
by combining the steps to include a single step, it must include the 
use of a composition of matter, and the claim could not be a medi-
cal activity under the exception defined by section 
287(c)(2)(A)(ii).402  Thus, the determination of what constitutes a 
medical activity under this exception undesirably depends on the 
form of the claim.403 
The House Report also proposes a two-part test for determining 
whether a motion to dismiss or summary judgment can be used to 
determine whether an accused infringer falls within the second ex-
ception.404  Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)405 or for sum-
mary judgment under Rule 56406 are not practical tools for resolv-
ing the issue of whether a medical procedure falls under the 
 
398. Id. 
399. Id. 
400. This is especially true if both steps are to be performed simultaneously. 
401. Id. 
402. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
403. Moreover, the House Report’s proposed analysis does not address the role of a 
claim’s preamble.  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996).  The preamble of a claim 
might include the use of composition of matter.  It is not clear how such a use in the pre-
amble would affect the two-part test. 
404. Id. (“It is intended that the applicability of the exception in 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) for 
a patented use of a composition of matter can usually be decided by a motion to dismiss 
or summary judgment under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
405. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
406. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
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exception defined under section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii).407 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6) would likely not reduce the likelihood of medical proce-
dure patent litigation.408  As a rule, dismissal of a suit for failure to 
state a claim is considered a drastic measure, and rarely occurs.409  
The Supreme Court has held that a complaint should not be dis-
missed under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that 
would entitle him to relief.”410  Therefore, a court must assume, for 
purposes of deciding a motion, that the medical procedure patent 
owner will prove any necessary factual allegations.411  Because 
such motions are rarely successful, the availability of such a mo-
tion would likely not prevent, or even reduce, litigation. 
Also, a motion to dismiss under Rule 56 would not lower the 
likelihood of medical procedure patent litigation.412  Under Rule 
56(c), a summary judgement may be rendered only if “there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact.”413  A court may therefore 
only consider the undisputed material facts of the case.414  Then, 
only using the undisputed facts, “the moving party is entitled to a 
judgement as a matter of law.”415  A patent owner, however, need 
only dispute material facts to make such a judgement unlikely or 
impossible.  Therefore, a motion for summary judgement under 
Rule 56 would likely not prevent litigation because the existence of 
even one material fact in dispute, renders summary judgement im-
possible.416 
A medical practitioner has different burdens of proof for each 
of the two conditions suggested by the House Report.417  The ra-
 
407. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
408. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
409. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 
290 (2d ed. 1992). 
410. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
411. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
412. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
413. Id. 56(c). 
414. Id. 
415. Id. 
416. Id. 
417. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
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tionale for requiring “clear and convincing evidence” of the lack of 
novelty in the recited uses of the compositions of matter, while re-
quiring “a preponderance of the evidence” demonstrating that the 
medical or surgical procedure steps are novel and non-obvious is 
uncertain.418  Under this framework, a medical practitioner would 
have a disincentive to try to prove that certain steps of the claim at 
issue are, by themselves,419 novel and non-obvious.420  Thus, not 
only does the burden of proof for the two conditions appear arbi-
trary, but satisfying them could also be hazardous for an accused 
infringer. 
Even if a defendant met the burdens of proof, thereby prevent-
ing a trial, the defendant would still have been subject to substan-
tial pre-trial litigation.  The minimum burden on a defendant would 
be to show that the recited uses of the compositions of matter lack 
novelty.421  A determination of novelty under section 102, how-
ever, may not be trivial.422  Moreover, nothing under the law pre-
vents a patent owner from bringing a patent infringement suit.  
Such a suit may be desirable to obtain a declaration of infringe-
ment for proving contributory infringement under section 
271(c),423 for which no relief is provided in section 287(c).424  
Thus, even if a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) or a motion for 
summary judgement under Rule 56 were granted, the substantial 
burden of pre-trial litigation would not be avoided. 
According to the exception in section 287(c)(2)(A)(iii), a 
medical activity does not include “the practice of a process in vio-
lation of a biotechnology patent.”425  The House Report explains 
that a biotechnology patent includes a patent on a biotechnological 
 
418. Id. 
419. The phrase “by themselves” is ambiguous.  The phrase could refer to steps of 
the claimed method that do not involve uses of compositions of matter in combination or 
individually.  This question would likely be another source of litigation. 
420. The House Report indicates that a medical practitioner may concede non-
obviousness instead of making the required evidentiary showing.  See H.R. CONF. REP. 
NO. 104-2702. 
421. This is true in the unlikely event that the practitioner concedes that the medical 
or surgical procedure steps are novel and non-obvious. 
422. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 51. 
423. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
424. § 287(c). 
425. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
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process, as defined in section 103(b),426 as well as a patent on a 
process of making or using biological materials, including treat-
ment using those materials, where those materials have been ma-
nipulated ex vivo at the cellular or molecular level.427  Neverthe-
less, the House Report’s proffered definition of a biotechnology 
patent does not help medical practitioners avoid litigation. 
The question of whether a medical procedure falls under the 
third exception would likely be answered in the two-step Mark-
man-like inquiry described with respect to the first and second ex-
ceptions.428  In this case, it would include establishing the meaning 
and scope of claimed “biotechnology patent,” and comparing the 
properly construed meaning and scope of the claimed subject mat-
ter with the performance of the medical practitioner. 
As is the case with the first and second exceptions,429 an in-
quiry in the case of the third exception is also undesirable.  Chief 
among these reasons is the substantial burden of pre-trial litigation.  
In addition, the third exception has further weaknesses.  The pre-
cise definition of what constitutes a biotechnology patent is so 
vague and potentially broad that the third exception arguably swal-
lows the rule set forth in section 287(c)(1).430 
The first type of biotechnological patent is a “biotechnological 
process,” as defined by a relatively new and complicated statute, 
namely, section 103(b)(3).431  There is no case law construing the 
scope and meaning of that definition.  Thus, any use of section 
287(c) could lead to substantial litigation over the intended mean-
ing and scope of the term biotechnological process. 
The second type of biotechnological patent is a patented proc-
ess of making or using biological materials manipulated ex vivo at 
the cellular or molecular level.  The House Report defines a bio-
logical material very broadly, including cellular, intracellular, ex-
 
426. § 103(b). 
427. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
428. See discussion supra note 358 and accompanying text (describing the excep-
tion under section 287(c)(2)(A)(i)); discussion supra notes 306-329 and accompanying 
text (describing the exception under section 287(c)(2)(A)(ii)). 
429. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 287(c)(2)(A)(i), 287(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
430. § 287(c)(1). 
431. § 103(b)(3). 
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tracelluar, and even acellular substances.432  The House Report 
does not provide a single example of a material that would not 
meet the definition of “a biological material.”433  Furthermore, the 
definition of “ex vivo manipulation” is so broad that the exception 
defined by section 287(c)(2)(A)(iii) practically engulfs the rule.434  
“Ex vivo manipulation” of a biological material includes “propaga-
tion, expansion, selection, purification, pharmaceutical treatment, 
or alteration of the biological characteristics of these substances 
outside of a human body.”435  This inclusive definition is so broad 
that nearly any patented process performed on any biological sub-
stance outside a human body appears to be included. 
Thus, the third exception is over broad and ineffective at reduc-
ing patent litigation.  Accordingly, any application of the third ex-
ception, as defined by section 287(c)(2)(A)(iii), would not advance 
the policy goal voiced by many of its proponents, that is, protect-
ing doctors from such litigation.436 
3. “Constitutes an Infringement” 
The third part of the proposed three-part analysis will only be 
reached if the questions raised in the first and second parts of the 
analysis are affirmatively answered.  Otherwise, the liability ex-
ception available under section 287(c) would be unavailable.437 
This third part involves determining whether the medical activ-
ity constitutes an infringement under Sections 271(a) or 271(b).438  
Section 271(a) states that “who[m]ever without authority makes, 
uses, offers to sell or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the 
patent.”439  Section 271(b) states that whomever “actively induces 
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”440  Thus, 
but for new section 287(c)(1), a medical activity would otherwise 
 
432. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
433. Id. 
434. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
435. Id. 
436. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
437. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
438. §§ 271(a), 271(b). 
439. § 271(a). 
440. § 271(b). 
ALTEN.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
896 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:837 
constitute infringement if a medical practitioner either makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells the claimed invention, or induces the same.441 
According to section 287(c)(1), if the medical activity consti-
tutes an infringement in accordance with step three, no remedy for 
infringement would be available to the patent owner, including in-
junctions, damages, and attorney fees, against the medical practi-
tioner or a “related health care entity” with respect to the medical 
activity.442  Under section 287(c)(2)(C), a “related health care en-
tity” is an entity with which a medical practitioner has a “profes-
sional affiliation” under which the medical practitioner performs 
the medical activity.443  Under that section, a health care entity 
may be, but is not limited to, a nursing home, hospital, medical 
school, or health maintenance organization.444  Under section 
287(c)(2)(D), a “professional affiliation” is broadly construed to 
be, among other things, employment contracts and ownership in-
terests.445 
Any application of this third part would not likely cause sub-
stantial litigation because infringement under sections 271(a) and 
271(b) would most likely be conceded by a defendant wishing to 
obtain immunity in a patent infringement suit.  The statute is nev-
ertheless discriminatory because it provides a liability exception 
only for medical practitioners and related health care entities.  As a 
result of the discriminatory nature of section 287(c),446 it fails to 
protect medical patients, who are not medical practitioners nor re-
lated health care entities, from patent infringement suits arising 
from the performance of unauthorized medical procedures, includ-
ing lifesaving procedures.447  For this reason, section 287(c) does 
not solve the purported problem with medical procedure patents of 
restricting life-saving medical procedures. 
 
441. §§ 271(a), 271(b). 
442. § 287(c)(1). 
443. § 287(c)(2)(C). 
444. Id. 
445. § 287(c)(2)(D). 
446. § 287(c). 
447. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2207 (1996).  The Heimlich maneuver is an ex-
ample of a medical procedure that, if patented, would arguably not be protected by sec-
tion 287(c). 
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B. Two Medical Procedure Patents Examples 
The proposed three-part analytical framework would determine 
whether section 287(c) would be applied to a defendant.  To illus-
trate the mechanisms of this structured inquiry, it will now be ap-
plied to two distinct patent claims in the United States, that is, Pat-
ent Numbers 5,638,831 and 4,886,831. 
1. Brown:  United States Patent Number 5,638,831 
In 1997, New York concert pianist Stephanie Brown was is-
sued a United States patent for her method of preventing repetitive 
stress injuries while using a computer keyboard.448  Brown devel-
oped the technique for musicians and later adapted it to computer 
keyboard operations.449  The method prevents repetitive stress inju-
ries by providing “a natural line” between the hand, wrist, and 
forearm.450 
The Brown method includes five steps.451  In the first step, the 
hand and wrist move in a straight line so that the forearm forms a 
natural line position.452  In the second step, the hand reaches for an 
object while allowing the elbow to follow the hand naturally.453  In 
the third step, the hand and wrist are angled sideways relative to 
the forearm.454  In the fourth step, the hand, wrist, and forearm are 
returned to the natural line position.455  And in the fifth and last 
step, the hand is placed on a keyboard while maintaining the natu-
 
448. See Repetitive Stress Patent, supra note 395. 
449. See id. 
450. Id. 
451. Id.  The Brown method reads as follows: 
 A method for providing a natural line between the hand, wrist and forearm, 
comprising the steps of:  moving the hand and wrist in a straight line with the 
forearm thereby forming a natural line position reaching for an object with the 
hand and allowing the elbow to follow the hand naturally; angling the hand and 
wrist sideways relative to the forearm, thereby forming an angled wrist posi-
tion; returning the hand, wrist and forearm to said natural line position; and 
placing the hand on a keyboard while maintaining said natural line position. 
Id. 
452. Id. 
453. Id. 
454. Id. 
455. Id. 
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ral line position.456 
The proposed three-part framework is now applied to the 
Brown method.  Summarizing, the three-part framework involves 
determining whether (1) the performance of an accused infringer is 
“with respect to a medical practitioner,” (2) the claimed procedure 
is directed to “a medical activity,” and (3) the medical activity con-
stitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or 271(b). 
The first step involves determining whether the claimed 
method is with respect to a medical practitioner’s performance.457  
According to section 287(c)(1), claim 1 is with respect to a medical 
practitioner’s performance if it is performed under the direction of 
a medical practitioner.458  Conversely, if a medical practitioner is 
not performed under such direction, the claim would not be with 
respect to a medical practitioner’s performance.459 
The second step involves determining whether the claim is di-
rected to a medical activity.  A medical activity, as defined by sec-
tion 287(c)(2)(A), means a “medical or surgical procedure on a 
body,” but does not include the three exceptions expressly defined 
in the section.460  The Brown method is probably a medical activity 
because it does not appear to fall under any of the three exceptions.  
Claim 1 of the Brown patent probably does not fall under the first 
exception because it does not involve the use of a patented ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter.461  Nor does claim 1 
of the Brown patent fall under the second exception because there 
is no use of a composition of matter, let alone a patented use of 
one.462  Finally, claim 1 does not fall under the third exception be-
cause it does not involve the use of a biotechnology patent, as de-
fined by section 103(b).463 
The third step of the proposed analysis involves determining 
whether the medical practitioner’s performance constitutes direct 
 
456. Id. 
457. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) 
458. Id. 
459. Id. 
460. § 287(c)(2)(A) 
461. See § 287(c)(2)(A)(i). 
462. See § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
463. See § 287(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
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infringement under section 271(a) or inducement to infringe under 
section 271(b).464  A court would likely find direct infringement, if 
the medical practitioner practices the method himself, or induce-
ment to infringe, if the practitioner encourages someone else to 
practice the claimed method.465  The nature of the claimed method, 
however, probably precludes the making, offering to sell, or selling 
of the invention. 
Thus, the availability of relief under section 287(c)(1) depends 
on the identity or profession of the patient.  If the patient is a medi-
cal practitioner (or under the direction of a medical practitioner), 
the activity falls within the meaning of section 287(c)(1).466  In that 
case, relief under section 287(c) would be available to an accused 
infringer.467  If the patient is not a medical practitioner (nor under 
the direction of a medical practitioner), however, the activity 
would not fall within the meaning of section 287(c)(1) and relief 
would not be available.468  This leads to the inequitable result that 
medical practitioners can practice the patented invention with im-
munity while the general public can not.  Clearly, this is neither 
desirable nor intended. 
Moreover, section 287(c)(1) fails to advance the policy goals 
voiced by many of its proponents.469  One such goal was to prevent 
restriction of useful medical procedures by the public, including 
relatively simple ones like the Heimlich maneuver.470  A direct 
comparison of the Brown method to a hypothetical claim covering 
the Heimlich maneuver illustrates this point.  Like the Heimlich 
maneuver, the Brown method can be used without a medical prac-
titioner and practiced without the aid of any patented device or 
drug.  And, for the same reasons that the Brown method is a medi-
cal activity, a hypothetical claim covering the Heimlich maneuver 
would also by a medical activity.  Being such, both the Brown 
 
464. See §§ 271(a), 271(b). 
465. See §§ 271(a), 271(b).  Infringement would be determined under a two-step 
Markman-like analysis.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (creating two-part patent infringement test), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
466. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). 
467. § 287(c). 
468. § 287(c)(1). 
469. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
470. See id. 
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method and the Heimlich maneuver would not be protected under 
section 287(c)(1), and performance by the public would therefore 
be punishable under the law.471  Thus, even though section 
287(c)(1) is available, the public still would not be entitled to 
freely practice either of the claimed procedures.  This result is 
clearly not consistent with the policy goals voiced by the propo-
nents of section 287(c)(1).472 
Thus, while the public would not be permitted to use the 
Brown method, or the Heimlich maneuver, if patented, medical 
practitioners would be allowed without restriction.  Accordingly, 
section 287(c)(1), like its statutory predecessor Senate Bill 1334,473 
creates a discriminatory infringement liability exception for medi-
cal practitioners.474  Moreover, section 287(c)(1) further discrimi-
nates based on the field of invention, i.e., medical procedures as 
opposed to other type of procedures.475  If the intended result of 
section 287(c) is to make patented medical procedures available 
with less restriction, the exemption should apply to all patients, re-
gardless of their identity or profession.476 
2. Marcos:  United States Patent Number 4,886,831 
In 1989, a patent for the medical uses of phycocyanin was is-
sued to N. Charlie Marcos.477  The Marcos method describes a 
photochemical method for treating atherosclerosis or cancer.478  
The Marcos method includes three steps.479  In a first step, a 
 
471. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). 
472. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
473. S. 1334, 104th Cong. (1995). 
474. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). 
475. Id. 
476. Id. 
477. See Medical Uses For Phycocyanin, United States Patent No. 4,886,831 (is-
sued Dec. 12, 1989) [hereinafter Phycocyanin Patent]. 
478. Atherosclerosis is characterized by irregularly distributed lipid deposits that 
may lead to a variety of more serious conditions.  See ILLUSTRATED STEDMAN’S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY 136 (24th ed. 1982).  Cancer is usually characterized by malignant growths 
or tissue.  See id.  An advantage of the Marcos treatment is that the atherosclerotic 
plaques and cancer growths are selectively destroyed with little or no damage to the sur-
rounding healthy cells or tissue.  See Phycocyanin Patent, supra note 477. 
479. Id.  The Marcos patent reads as follows: 
A method for treating atherosclerosis by destroying atherosclerotic plaques 
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physiologically compatible solution containing an effective amount 
of phycocyanin is intravascularly injected.480  In a second step, 
means for irradiating the plaques in contact with the phycocyanin 
is intravascularly inserted.481  And, in a third step, the plaques are 
irradiated for a period of time effective to destroy the plaques with 
the means for irradiating.482 
The proposed three-part analytical framework is now applied to 
the Marcos method.  First, a performance is “with respect to a 
medical practitioner,” when the defendant is a medical practitioner 
or under the supervision of a medical practitioner.483  Invasive 
techniques, especially ones that involve intravascular insertion of 
medical devices, are almost certainly procedures within the domain 
of a medical doctor.  Such a doctor would either be licensed by a 
state or under the direction of one (as in the case of a clinical in-
ternship).484  Thus, it is more likely than not that any performance 
of the Marcos method would be with respect to a medical practi-
tioner. 
A medical activity under section 287(c)(2)(A) must be a 
“medical or surgical procedure on a body,” but may not fall under 
any of the three statutory exceptions.485  Clearly the Marcos 
method is a medical procedure; the question is whether it satisfies 
an exception.  Unfortunately, the determination of whether any of 
these exceptions applies requires answering many vague and fact-
based questions. 
Under the first exception, a “medical activity” does not include 
 
comprising: 
a. Intravascular injection of a physiologically compatible solution containing an 
effective amount of phycocyanin to effect contact of said phycocyanin with 
said atherosclerotic plaques; 
b. Intravascular insertion of a means for irradiating said plaques in contact with 
said phycocyanin with light of certain wavelengths; and 
c. Exposure of said plaques to said means of irradiating light for period of time 
effective to destroy said plaques. 
Id. 
480. Id. 
481. Id. 
482. Id. 
483. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(B) 
484. See § 287(c)(2). 
485. Id. § 287(c)(2)(A). 
ALTEN.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
902 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:837 
the use of a “patented technology.”486  The question of whether a 
given performance of the Marcos method is in violation of a pat-
ented technology requires (1) establishing the meaning and scope 
of claimed patented technology, and (2) comparing the properly 
construed meaning and scope of the claims with the performance 
of the medical practitioner.  The first step of the Marcos patent 
calls for the use of a “physiologically compatible solution contain-
ing an effective amount of phycocyanin.”487  Thus, if the solution 
was separately patented, the medical practitioner’s performance 
could be in violation of the patent covering the solution.  More-
over, the second and third steps of the Marcos method call for the 
use of a “means for irradiating.”488  Thus, if that means were sepa-
rately patented, the medical practitioner’s performance could also 
be in violation of the separate patent covering the means. 
In either case, a doctor who practiced the Marcos method 
might have to show non-infringement of both of those viable pat-
ented technologies in order to obtain relief under section 287(c)(1) 
with respect to the original medical procedure patents.489  The 
more patent infringement suits brought against a medical practitio-
ner, the more thinly limited resources must be spread to defend 
against the suits.  Due to the increased risk inherent in multiple 
litigation, a medical practitioner would be even less likely to pre-
vail unscathed, especially if juries are involved.  If the medical 
practitioner is found to infringe just one patented technology, relief 
under section 287(c)(1) would be unavailable.490  The additional 
litigation burden created by section 287(c)(1) could not have been 
one of the results intended by its proponents.491 
Under the second exception, a practice of the Marcos method 
would not be a medical activity if it included “the practice of a pat-
ented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent,” 
unless that use does not directly contribute to the achievement of 
 
486. See supra note 360 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding the term patented). 
487. Phycocyanin Patent, supra note 477; see also supra note 479 (quoting the Phy-
cocyanin Patent). 
488. Phycocyanin Patent, supra note 477. 
489. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). 
490. Id. 
491. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-2702 (1996). 
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the objective of the claimed method.  The first step of the Marcos 
method uses a “physiologically compatible solution containing an 
effective amount of phycocyanin.”492  The Marcos patent itself ex-
plains that there are at least two other patented procedures for de-
livery and irradiation of phycocyanin in atherosclerotic arteries.493  
Thus, any analysis of the Marcos method would probably include 
analysis of those two patents. 
This analysis must determine if the use of the physiologically 
compatible solution “directly contributes” to the achievement of 
the objective of the Marcos patent.  The use of the physiologically 
compatible solution will directly contribute if it is “itself novel or 
if it contributes to or is necessary to establish the non-obviousness 
of the claim as a whole.”494  Any determination of novelty would 
probably be contested, at least in light of the prior art disclosed in 
the Marcos patent and any other art that may be discovered along 
the way.  Therefore, any determination regarding the non-
obviousness of the Marcos method in view of its use of the solu-
tion would require the establishment of a new fact-based standard.  
Moreover, litigants would be averse to contesting novelty and non-
obviousness because doing so may compromise other related liti-
gation positions.  Thus, the “directly contributes” standard is an 
unworkable tool for resolving whether the use of the physiologi-
cally compatible solution directly contributes to the achievement of 
the objective of the Marcos method. 
If the first two parts of the proposed analysis are answered in 
the affirmative, thereby permitting us to reach the third and final 
part, the accused infringer would likely concede infringement un-
der section 271(a) or 271(b) and obtain immunity under section 
287(c).495  Relief, however, would only be available under section 
287(c) if the accused infringer successfully defended herself 
against any and all infringement suits that may arise under the 
three exceptions.496 
 
492. Phycocyanin Patent, supra note 477. 
493. Id. 
494. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A). 
495. § 287(c). 
496. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Section 287(c) fails to address many of the problems that 
prompted its enactment.  Chief among them are that medical pro-
cedure patents force doctors to engage in unnecessary litigation, 
allow patent owners to abuse life-saving medical procedures, and 
chill the open informational exchange that exists among physi-
cians.  Furthermore, section 287(c) is both discriminatory and un-
acceptably vague. 
Medical procedure patents are problematic because they invite 
doctors to litigate in courtrooms rather than perform surgery in op-
erating rooms.  Section 287(c) does nothing to solve that purported 
problem.  On the contrary, section 287(c) will probably provide 
fertile ground for new litigation because the statute defines many 
new definitions and tests, the scope of which have yet to be accu-
rately defined. 
Most of the definitions and tests are for the purpose of deter-
mining whether a particular medical performance is a “medical ac-
tivity,” as defined by section 287(c)(2)(A).  The first issue that 
may arise is how “directly related” a performance on a nonhuman 
body must be to a treatment of a human body to qualify as a medi-
cal activity. 
After establishing that the performance is a medical activity, it 
is necessary to see if the performance falls under any of the three 
expressly stated exceptions.  A patent owner seeking relief against 
a medical practitioner should argue that one or more of the excep-
tions apply to attempt to prevent the accused infringer from escap-
ing liability via section 287(c).  Thus, in the first exception, “a pat-
ented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” in the 
second exception, “a patented use of a composition of matter,” and 
in the third exception, “a biotechnology patent” are terms that will 
be certain subjects of litigation, especially in light of the prece-
dents proposed in the House Report. 
For each exception, determining whether a practitioner may 
avail himself of that exception depends on whether his perform-
ance is “in violation” of a claim in the same patent or other patents.  
Because this question is just another way of inquiring whether the 
defendant infringes other patented subject matter referred to by the 
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exceptions, a completely separate infringement analysis would be 
required for each of the relevant exceptions.  The proponents of 
section 287(c) could not possibly have intended this litigation 
chain reaction. 
Another problem purportedly addressed by section 287(c) is 
that medical procedure patents allow patent owners to abuse life-
saving procedures by preventing or restricting their use.  Section 
287(c), however, is unnecessary to protect against such abuse be-
cause a court would likely deny an owner of a patented life-saving 
medical procedure relief in the form of damages, injunctive relief, 
or attorney’s fees. 
Yet another purported problem of medical procedure patents 
allegedly addressed by section 287(c) is that these patents hinder 
the free informational exchange among health-care providers, 
thereby causing a chilling effect between them.  Under section 
287(c), medical procedures are still patentable, just not enforce-
able.  Therefore, any resulting chilling effect is not reduced be-
cause that process is left unchanged.  Moreover, there is little sup-
port for the argument that patents have a chilling effect on 
communication within any technological field.  Under United 
States patent law, an inventor may freely discuss with peers the in-
vention immediately upon its discovery, and still obtain patent pro-
tection, as long as a patent application is filed within one year of its 
disclosure.  Section 287(c) does not change this.  Thus, the statute 
does not address, let alone solve, the purported problem of hinder-
ing the free informational exchange that many proponents of the 
statute believe exists between physicians. 
In addition to failing to address the problems that called for its 
enactment, section 287(c) is discriminatory in at least two ways.  
First, it provides a liability exception for “medical practitioners” 
and “related health care entities,” but not for the general public.  
Therefore, the general public would still be subject to relief 
granted under sections 281, 283, 284, and 285.  Second, the statute 
discriminates with respect to a single field of invention, namely, 
the field of medical procedures.  That discrimination removes the 
financial incentive to invent and to fully disclose inventions to the 
medical community. 
As a consequence of these failures, section 287(c) is destined 
ALTEN.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
906 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:837 
to cause even more litigation and inequitable results.  At minimum, 
the section needs significant modification.  The best solution, how-
ever, may be to repeal the section in its entirety. 
